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Is Russia a democracy? What about Ukraine, Nigeria, Indonesia, Turkey, or Venezuela?  
There was a time when these were simple questions of regime classification. 
 But the empirical reality in these countries is a lot messier than it was two decades ago, 
 and so, in a way, is the never-ending dialogue on how to think about and classify regimes. 






The literature on authoritarian regimes is several decades old and has gone through 
significant phases of research. The bulk of academic contributions focuses on regimes’ 
economic performance and endurance, while less attention has been devoted to the 
policy-making process in those contexts. One of the reasons for this pattern in 
authoritarian research is the idea that autocratic policy-making is strictly top-down and 
societal participation is quite limited, therefore meaning that policy decisions reflect only 
autocrats’ interests (Boix and Svolik 2013). Recent contributions, however, demonstrate 
that autocrats do not live in isolation (Geddes 1999) or govern with the mere use of 
repression and power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007); they also distribute ‘carrots’ to their 
citizens in order to acquire political consensus (Gallagher and Hanson 2009). In light of 
those contributions, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate which factors drive policy 
decisions in authoritarian contexts. More specifically, this dissertation aims to answer the 
following research questions: What are the determinants of social spending in 
authoritarian regimes? And how autocrats allocate public expenditure across different 
sectors?1 
 




To answer such questions, I build on past research on authoritarianism and develop a new 
and inclusive approach that captures both the economic and political factors that influence 
policy decisions in authoritarian contexts. Economic growth is usually associated with 
better economic and social outcomes. On one hand, it enlarges the pool of goods and 
services that governments can tap into, and on the other hand, it steers citizens’ demand 
for social benefits and investments. Also, Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that better 
economic performance impinges on the income of the median voter in democracies and 
the members of the ruling coalition in autocracies. That being said, countries differ very 
much in terms of economic performance. For instance, countries that rely on the 
production and export of natural resources, such as oil and gas, face more challenges in 
fostering economic growth. In fact, natural resource endowment seems to be more of a 
curse then a blessing in both democratic and autocratic regimes (Auty 2001; 
Brunnschweiler 2008; M. L. Ross 1999b; Sachs and Warner 1999). 
 Economic performance and natural resource endowment, however, are not the only 
factors that steer the allocation of public goods. While economic growth helps us to detect 
patterns of social spending, economic performance does not always translate into social 
policy decisions. In fact, I hypothesize that there are other factors that might influence 
the relationship between economic growth and social policy decisions. For instance, 
despite different economic situations, the Cuban regime under Fidel Castro from 1959 to 
2008 differed from the Italian Fascist regime under Benito Mussolini in many aspects, 
including the political ideology, level of repression, institutional settings and size of the 
ruling coalition. Thus, more than a single perspective is required to analyse variations of 
social spending across authoritarian regimes. 
By combining different approaches, this dissertation aims to strengthen our 
understanding of autocratic policy-making and explain different patterns of social 
spending, particularly in the health and education sectors, across authoritarian regimes. 
Additionally, the dissertation aims to provide theoretical reasoning and empirical means 
to save Western democracies. In 2018, Freedom House published a report titled 
‘Democracy in Crisis’, which argues that the overall state of democracy has deteriorated 
to its lowest point in most countries over the last decade: ‘for the 12th consecutive year, 
countries that have suffered democratic setbacks outnumbered those that registered gains’ 
(Freedom House 2018, p.1). The report shows that the number of countries considered to 
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be ‘free’ or ‘partially free’ decreased from 2007 to 2017, whereas the number of countries 
classified as ‘not free’ increased by more than 3% over the same decade. Both the 
Economist Intelligent Unit (2019) and the Variates of Democracies (V-DEM) (2019) 
reports on the current state of democracy depict a very similar picture. In particular, the 
Economist Intelligent Unit (2018) concludes its analysis by saying that ‘this year [2019] 
is the worst democratic performance since 2006’ (EIU 2019, p.1). Overall, nowadays, we 
witness a decline in political participation, civil rights and electoral pluralism in 
consolidated Western democracies, while autocracies remain strong and long-lived 
regimes worldwide. In light of such considerations and empirical evidence, the ultimate 
goals of this work are to unravel the dynamics of policy decisions in non-democratic 




1.1 History of Dictatorship(s) 
 
A good point of departure for analysing policy decisions in non-democratic contexts is to 
look at the roots of authoritarianism and reflect upon how authoritarian regimes have 
developed in history. As Cicero says in ‘De Oratore’ (55 B.C.), ‘historia magistrate vitae’. 
That is, by looking at the historical evolution of dictatorships, it is possible to disentangle 
the regimes’ inner institutional characteristics and identify political and economic factors 
that drive autocrats’ policy decisions. 
 The term ‘dictatorship’ was used for the first time during the Roman Empire 
(Nicolet 2004). When internal rebellions or external war were threating the stability of 
the Empire, the Roman Senate appointed one of the two consuls of the Republic as 
dictator. The dictator had no limitations on his use of political power, but he had to 
abdicate from his position as soon as the old political and constitutional order was 
restored. It was only after few  years, when the Senate began to fear the indiscriminate 
use of power in the hands of a single man, that it implemented a term limit of no more 
than six months.  
Between 501 and 202 B.C., 76 dictators were legitimised by the Senate to use 
military power to confront foreign invasions or domestic rebellions. All of them 
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eventually devolved the power back to the Senate. In 46 B.C., however, the Senate 
extended the term limit from six months to ten years at the request of Consul Gaius Julius 
Caesar. However, once he became dictator, Julius Caesar abolished the term limit and 
proclaimed himself ‘dictator for life’. 
After the Roman experience with dictatorship, the term was seldom used during the 
Middle Ages. However, it was revived in 1793, when the French National Convention 
established a provisional government aiming to serve as a dictatorship for a revolutionary 
group: the Committee of Public Health. The French experience completely changed the 
meaning of the term ‘dictatorship’; for the first time, dictatorship was associated with 
political control of a (revolutionary) group of people over the rest of the population.  
Enriched with a group connotation and a revolutionary goal, the term was then used 
by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to refer to a transition period in which an entire class 
of people takes over the rest of the population and guides the masses towards ‘the 
abolition of class distinctions . . . the abolition of all the relations on production . . . the 
abolition of all the social relations . . . and to revolutionizing all the ideas that result from 
these social relations’ (Marx 1984, p. 123 ). Marx and Engels’ idea of the ‘dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ was revived a few years later when Vladimir Lenin made it the slogan of 
the 1917 Russian Revolution. After the Communist Party took over and established the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the dictatorship of the working class was 
slowly replaced with the dictatorship of members of the Communist Party and the 
Politburo. In 1922, when Joseph Stalin became the Secretary General of the Communist 
Party, the nature of the communist dictatorship changed again. With the concentration of 
power in the hands of one strong leader who controls the political agenda and uses 
military power to repress people, the emergence of a new ideology that pervades every 
aspect of the society and the elimination of opposition groups, the communist dictatorship 
transformed itself into a new kind of dictatorship: a totalitarian regime. 
 By the beginning of 1930s, two other types of dictatorships emerged: the National 
Socialist government in Germany and the Fascist government in Italy. Those regimes 
were similar to the Soviet regime; all were characterised by a well-equipped ideology, 
the absence of any social or political pluralism and extensive political mobilisation. In 
addition, both the German and Italian dictatorships had a charismatic leader with 
unlimited political power and encompassing control over individuals’ private lives. 
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During that time, repression and military power were used for mass extermination to 
create a new race. The historical German experience in particular demonstrates that there 
were no limits to the brutality of the regime, the pervasive presence of the state in every 
aspect of life and the imposition of a new society. 
To sum up, the term ‘dictatorship’ has evolved over time and changed meanings 
based on historical events. First, it was used by the Romans to refer to a type of political 
regime in which one leader holds unlimited power for a short time and makes policy 
decisions for the well-being of citizens. Then, the Soviet regime brought about the group 
dimension and reinforced the importance of control over the masses. Interestingly, before 
the end of the 19th  century, the term was not imbued with the pejorative meaning it has 
today. The rise of National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy added the 
components of unlimited power in the hands of a group of people and the presence of a 
charismatic leader who intervenes in every aspect of society to impose an ideology. 
 
 
1.2 The World of Modern Dictatorships  
 
Are all modern dictatorships equal? And how are political power and economic structures 
organised in these regimes today? In light of the historical evolution of dictatorship, it is 
reasonable to assume that non-democratic regimes differ greatly in many aspects. The 
literature on authoritarian regimes gives us plenty of typologies to describe the roles of 
formal and informal institutions in modern autocracies. These contributions help us to 
better grasp the extensive variation across current authoritarian regimes.  
 
Classifying modern autocracies  
Autocracy differs from democracy because political participation and public contestation 
are constrained (Dahl 1971) and political power is in the hands of a narrow group of 
people (Olson 1993). Przeworski et al. (2000), among others, note that the majority of 
current authoritarian regimes are ruled by a chief executive or prime minister who has, in 
most cases, been selected through elections. Thus, they distinguish between dictatorships 
with divided and monolithic regimes. Divided dictatorships are characterised by the 
presence of a legislature and/or political parties, while monolithic regimes do not have 
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any elections or legislature. Based on similar assumptions, Diamond (2002) uses 
multiparty electoral competition and the degree of political competitiveness within the 
regime to classify autocracies in two groups. The first group includes politically closed 
authoritarian regimes, in which no electoral competition is allowed, while the second 
includes electoral autocracies, in which some form of electoral competition is allowed. 
Formal institutions, such as elections and legislatures, have acquired tremendous 
attention in the authoritarian regime literature. Recently, Levitsky and Way (2010) 
distinguished between ‘competitive authoritarianism’ and ‘non-competitive 
authoritarianism’ based on the type of institutions adopted by the ruler. Competitive 
authoritarian regimes include ‘all authoritarian regimes in which opposition forces use 
democratic institution to seriously contest the executive power’(Levitsky and Way 2010, 
33). Non-competitive authoritarian regimes are those that either do not have any 
democratic institutions or those in which institutions serve as mere ‘window dressing’. In 
addition to the degree of competitiveness proposed by Diamond (2002), Levitsky and 
Way (2010) use three distinctive features to classify dictatorships: (1) the presence of 
democratic institutions, such as elections and civil liberties; (2) the status of opposition; 
and (3) the level of uncertainty. 
Many current contributions draw attention to the role of formal institutions. 
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) classify authoritarian regimes based on two 
distinctive criteria. First, they use the concept of hereditary succession to distinguish 
between monarchies and other dictatorships. Monarchies are ruled by one person who 
bears the title of ‘king’ and who has a hereditary successor. Second, the authors check 
from where the head of the government has been appointed. If the head of the government 
is part of the armed forces, the dictatorship is classified as a military dictatorship, and if 
he is not, then it is classified as a civilian dictatorship. Interestingly, they highlight that 
all types of autocracies feature the rule of so-called ‘inner sanctums’: ‘dictators frequently 
establish inner sanctums where real decisions are made and potential rivals are kept under 
close scrutiny’ (Gandhi 2008,p. 20).  Monarchies, for instance, rely on family and kin 
networks. Military rulers use juntas or groups of armed forces to make policy decisions 
and confine potential rivals. Civilian dictators create a political body, such as a bureau or 
party, to co-opt potential opposition groups.  
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A very similar approach to Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) typology is the 
classification proposed by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Wahman, Teorell and 
Hadenius (2013). Their classification is based on different ways of maintaining political 
power: (1) hereditary succession or lineage, (2) use of military force and (3) popular 
elections. Following this logic, they disentangle electoral regimes into no-party, single-
party and limited-multiparty regimes based on the extent of party competition within the 
country. 
A different approach to authoritarian regime classification was proposed by Geddes 
(1999) and Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). According to them, modern dictatorships 
can be distinguished by their informal institutions, which are ‘a set of formal and informal 
rules and procedures used by the ruling coalition to select national leaders and implement 
new policies’ (Geddes 1999, 116).That is, they are all the rules that identify the group 
from which the leader can come and that actually influence policy choices. Based on this 
definition, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) identify four different types of 
authoritarian regimes: military, personalist, single-party and amalgamations of the three 
types. Each is characterised by different types of ruling coalitions, different procedures 
for decision-making, different procedures for choosing leaders and different ways of 
responding to the opposition (Geddes 1999). In military regimes, for instance, there is a 
group of officers that determines who will lead the country and influences the policy-
making process. In personalist regimes, power is mostly concentrated in the hands of a 
single officer who has successfully marginalised other representatives of the ruling 
coalition. Hence, he is the only one who can make policy decisions. Finally, single-party 
regimes are characterised by the presence of one political party that exercises some power 
over the leader, controls the career paths of officials, organises the distribution of benefits 
to supporters and mobilises citizens to vote.  
Recently, the informal institution approach has received increased attention as a 
way to explain policy decisions in authoritarian regimes (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). 
According to this approach, many autocracies hide de facto rules that constrain political 
choices behind a façade of formal democratic institutions (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 
2014). Thus, focusing on power-sharing commitments (Boix and Svolik 2013; Magaloni 
2008) and the ways in which autocrats legitimise their positions of power (Croissant and 
Wurster 2013; Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; von Soest and Grauvogel 2017) can 
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provide a more comprehensive picture of how modern dictatorships work.  
 
Empirical evidence of modern autocracies  
 
Figure 1.1 shows the overall number of countries with each type of autocratic regime 
according to Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius’s (2013) classification. As it can be seen, 
the number of military and single-party regimes was very high from 1970 to 1990. Yet, 
with the advent of the third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991a), an increasing 
number of countries shifted from closed to electoral regimes. Some authoritarian regimes 
transitioned to democratic regimes, especially in Latin America, while others established 
institutions such as elections and legislations. This pattern is shown in the steep curve for 
limited-multiparty regimes. Since 1990, the number of countries that have established 
institutions has sharply increased2, and electoral regimes remain the most common type 
of autocracy today.  
Figure 1.2 illustrates the number of countries and types of autocratic regimes that 
have existed from 1946 to 2010 according to Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) 
classification. Similar to Figure 1.1, this graph shows that military regimes were very 
common in the second half of the 20th century, but they slowly diminished in favour of 
civilian dictatorships. As mentioned before, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) define 
civilian dictatorships as those regimes in which the leader does not belong to either the 
military or a royal family. Hence, unlike when Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius’s (2013) 
classification is applied, Figure 1.2 shows that authoritarian regimes in which the ruler is 
not a member of the military junta or the royal family are more common today than both 
monarchies and military regimes.  
Independent of the type of classification, both figures suggest that authoritarian 
regimes differ greatly in terms of the presence of elections and legislatures and the type 
of head of government. Military regimes were the most common type of dictatorship until 
the 1990s, when, instead of democratising their countries, an increasing number of 
autocrats established nominally democratic institutions to secure their positions of power. 
 
2 According to Hadenius and Teorell (2007), limited-multiparty regimes include all autocracies (also 




Figure 1.1 Number of authoritarian regimes from 1970 to 2014 
according to Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius’s (2013) classification 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Number of authoritarian regimes from 1970 to 2010 
according to Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) classification  
  
 
Those regimes have managed to survive longer than both military regimes and 
monarchies. Nowadays in fact, limited-multiparty regimes are the most common type of 
autocracy in the world.  
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1.3 The Puzzle 
 
A missing piece in the research on authoritarian regimes is that autocrats differ not only 
in terms of the institutions they establish but also in terms of policy decisions and outputs. 
Figure 1.3 and 1.4 show the current levels of public health and education expenditure in 
authoritarian regimes3 in five geographical areas – Central Asia and Eastern Europe4, 
Latin America, the Middle East and Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia– 
from 1995 to 2014. As we can see, the regimes differ greatly in terms of public spending. 
While Latin American autocracies report consistently higher levels of public spending on 
both health and education, the level of expenditure in East Asian autocracies is much 
lower. In addition, the trends across those regions differ. For instance, the level of public 
spending on health has increased in Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries 
since the early 2000s, but it has remained stable in post-Soviet autocracies and countries 
located in the Middle East and North Africa region. 
However, Figures 1.5 and 1.6 contradict these trends. Figure 1.5, which illustrates 
the average level of public expenditure on healthcare, shows that the highest spenders are 
Cuba, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lesotho and Jordan, while the lowest spenders 
are Bangladesh, Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan and Myanmar. As 
we can see, these countries differ enormously in their levels of public health expenditure. 
The average level of health spending in Cuba – the highest spender – is almost eight times 
the average level of health spending in Myanmar – the lowest spender. Figure 1.6 shows 
the average level of public expenditure in education in the top five and bottom five 
autocracies in the same period. Similar to the previous figure, there is significant variation 
in the average levels of public education expenditure across autocracies, with Cuba – the 
highest spender – having almost ten times the expenditure of Zambia – the lowest 
spender.  
What drives public spending in authoritarian regimes? Why do Cuba, Lesotho and 
Croatia spend more on health than Myanmar, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo? And why do autocracies that spend more on health not spend a lot on education, 
 
3 Autocracies are defined according to Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) classification based on data from 
1990 to 2014.  
4 In this group, I also include the Caucasus and four countries such as Albania (1995-2001), Bosnia and   




Figure 1.3 Public health expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) 
across five geographical regions  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Public education expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) 
across five geographical regions  
 
 
and vice versa? Why do authoritarian regimes in Latin America tend to spend more than 
all other autocracies in the world? Why do non-democratic regimes in Asia have the 
lowest levels of public spending on both health and education compared to other 




Figure 1.5 Public health expenditure (as percentage of GDP) in the 




Figure 1.6 Public education expenditure (as percentage of GDP) in 
the top five and bottom five autocracies 
 
 
play a role in explaining such patterns? These are some of the questions that triggered the 
research on social spending in authoritarian regimes that is presented in this dissertation. 
The main research question – what are the determinants of public social spending in 
authoritarian regimes? – stems from those questions and builds on them. 
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1.4 The Argument in Brief  
 
To detect patterns of social spending in authoritarian regimes, I build on previous research 
that conducted social policy analysis of both developed and developing countries, and I 
elaborate a new theoretical approach. Prior academic contributions help to identify the 
factors that trigger social spending in democratic contexts. However, the theoretical 
framework I propose in this dissertation shows that there are other factors such as the type 
of the ruling coalition, the level of institutionalization and the level of military spending 
that should be taken into account when analysing social policy decisions in the context of 
authoritarianism. 
As argued before, economic performance is a good predictor of public spending in 
democracies. In particular, functionalist theories and rentier state literature point to 
countries’ economic growth and natural resource endowment as key determinants of 
social spending. That is, better economic performance and natural abundance increase the 
amount of resources at the government’s disposal. Following this logic, I reason that 
economic performance and natural resource endowment influence the allocation of 
resources to social sectors in authoritarian regimes. Similarly, I argue that the effects of 
globalisation shape the incentives for leaders to provide more or less distributive policies.  
Economic performance creates the conditions for more or less distribution of resources, 
but it does not always directly translate into more social spending; actors’ interests and 
political institutions also influence decisions to allocate more or less to social sectors. 
Here, I argue that differences in the organisation of power across authoritarian regimes 
reflect differences in the resulting policy decisions. For instance, in closed regimes, where 
political power is in the hands of a single person, such as the king or emir, I should expect 
the decision-making process to be more limited compared to regimes in which the 
leader’s position depends on the support of a larger ruling coalition and opposition 
groups. That is, if the stability of the regime depends on the preferences of the members 
of the winning coalition, the implemented policies should also reflect those preferences. 
China is a good example in this regard. As much political power is retained by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) rather than the president (Boulder 1999), policy decisions reflect 
the interests of the ruling coalition and the most powerful groups in the tradable industries 
(Steinberg and Shih 2012; Teets 2017). Built on those assumptions, I would expect to 
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witness different levels of public spending across authoritarian regimes with different 
levels of institutionalisation.  
Additionally, autocracies differ greatly in the way they legitimize their positions of 
power. Some countries, such as North Korea, China and Cuba, have followed a socialist 
ideology for many years, while the Argentinian government under Videla (who held 
power from 1962 to 1981) and the current government in Central African Republic have 
governed with repressive measures and without any political ideology. The way in which 
a leader and his ruling coalition legitimize his position in power and rule the country 
shape their interest in distributing more or less resources.  
Compared to authoritarian regimes, the decision-making process in democracies is 
more inclusive, as the government is selected by the citizens through free and fair 
elections and opposition groups can gain access to the political arena. Additionally, the 
political power in a democracy is not in the hands of a leader or a group of people, but is 
distributed across different actors. Following this line of reasoning, democratic regimes 
are more sensitive to citizens’ preferences, and thus they distribute more goods and 
services and invest more in education than authoritarian regimes. Based on this logic, 
authoritarian regimes that undergo a period of democratisation should show more social 
spending compared to long-standing dictatorships. 
 
 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology  
 
 
The empirical analysis described here draws on time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data. 
TSCS data consist of ‘repeated observations (often annual) on the same fixed political 
units (usually countries or states)’ (Beck 2001, 271). The number of units is fixed, and all 
inferences of interest are conditional on the observed units (Beck 2001). The advantage 
of using TSCS data is that it combines the possibility to study inter-unit differences 
(cross-sectional analysis) with intra-unit dynamics (time-series analysis). 
 The panel sample includes 93 authoritarian regimes from between 1995 and 2014. 
This period was selected for two reasons. First, with the advent of the third wave of 
democratisation (Huntington 1991b), an increasing number of countries shifted from 
dictatorships to democracy. In the same period, the third wave of democratisation brought 
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about the emergence of a new type of authoritarian regime: electoral autocracies 
(Schedler 2006) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010; 2002). 
Beginning in the 1990s, many autocrats began to establish nominally democratic 
institutions, such as elections and legislatures. Therefore, this period allows me to control 
for variation in institutional settings across authoritarian regimes. The second reason is 
that it is the longest time span and the most recent period for which data are available. 
Data on public health expenditure for non-democratic regimes are incomplete before 
1995, and data on public education expenditure are more limited after 2014 (Dahlberg et 
al. 2018).  
Countries have been identified as autocratic according to Hadenius and Teorell’s 
(2007) classification. As we have seen, the literature on authoritarianism provides many 
typologies for non-democratic regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Gandhi 2008a). Yet, in their classification, Hadenius and 
Teorell (2007) theorise that autocracy and democracy are two faces of the same coin, 
employing a quantitative threshold based on a continuous measure from full democracy 
and full autocracy. I believe that by looking at democracy and autocracy not as two 
distinctive categories, but as two ends of the same continuum, I can better analyse within-
regime variations.  
To estimate the determinants of public expenditure on health and education, I use 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with panel-corrected standard-errors 
estimators (PCSE). This technique has been widely used in large-N studies on social 
spending in both developed and developing countries (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; 
Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; 2001; Obinger 
and Kittel 2003; Wibbels 2006) According to Beck and Katz (1995), PCSE produces 
efficient estimators when units and contemporaneous heteroskedasticity remain the same 
over time. In particular, they suggest combining PCSE specifications that control for 
different variances of the errors across units (panel heteroskedasticity) with an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to solve serial problems in the error 
process. More specifically, they suggest adding a lagged dependent variable on the right 
side of the equation to control for serial correlation.  
Data on public health and education expenditure are collected from the World Bank 
dataset (2018) and the World Development Indicators (2018), and data on economic 
 
 26 
growth come from the Government Financial Statistics of the International Monetary 
Fund (IGFS) and the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (2017). Finally, oil and 
gas production data are retrieved from the Michael Ross and Mahdavi Oil and Gas dataset 
(2015), while data on political ideology come from the Inter-American Development 
Bank’s database of political institutions (DPI) (2015). Overall, all data and variables are 





The dissertation is organised into five chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on social 
policy and welfare states in both developed and developing contexts, presenting the 
theories and approaches used by scholars to explain variations in social policy output 
worldwide. The chapter is organised into four sections. The first presents the historical 
symbiosis between social policy and authoritarianism, and the second discusses the 
concept of social policy. The third section discusses welfare state theories for Western 
democracies, while the fourth section presents different approaches that have been used 
to analyse social policy in developing countries. The chapter ends with some reflections 
on the state of the art regarding social policy and suggestions for further development of 
the literature. 
Chapter 3 elaborates on the theoretical framework and main hypotheses. To this 
end, the chapter discusses the effects of both economic factors, such as economic growth, 
economic structure and globalisation, and political factors, such as the level of 
institutionalisation, political ideology and strength of opposition groups, on the allocation 
of public expenditure in health and education sectors. The resulting hypotheses stem from 
both previous contributions to the literature and preliminary empirical evidence. 
Chapter 4 describes a pooled time-series analysis performed to test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3. Specifically, the chapter displays descriptive statistics for the 
variables of interest and shows the relationship between the covariates and the dependent 
variables. The results demonstrate that economic growth is negative in relation to social 
spending in authoritarian regimes, as higher levels of GDP growth are associated with 
lower levels of public spending in both health and education. Contrary to the rentier state 
theory, the analysis shows that authoritarian regimes do not use natural resource rents to 
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distribute benefits to their population, as rent-seeking autocracies have lower levels of 
health and education spending compared to resource-poor autocracies. Finally, regarding 
the political factors, the empirical analysis demonstrates that both the size of the winning 
coalition and the level of institutionalisation partially influence policy decisions. Military 
regimes have the worst health and education expenditure compared to monarchies and 
civilian regimes. Instead, more institutionalised regimes, such as one-party and limited-
multiparty regimes, have significantly higher levels of public health and education 
expenditure compared to traditional regime types. Though, one-party regimes perform 
better than limited-multiparty regimes suggesting that party competition does not play a 
pivotal role in shaping policy decisions in autocracies. Additionally, political ideology 
has a different effect on health compared to education spending.  
Chapter 5 summarises the main hypothesis and concludes with a recapitulation of 
the main findings. It highlights the contributions of this dissertation and presents two 
challenges to the research on social policy in authoritarian regimes. First, it discusses the 
importance of studying public policy in authoritarian regimes and the need to abandon 
Western categories. Second, it argues that there is a need to further investigate other 
factors such actors’ policy preferences and opposition strength. To this end, we should 
collect more data on individual oppositions groups’ preferences and resources. Finally, 
there is a need to study the relationship between military and social spending more in 
details as both policies are complement to each other and can better predict patterns of 
social spending in authoritarian regimes.  
Overall, this work highlights the role of economic performance, natural resources 
and both informal and formal institutions in shaping policy decisions in authoritarian 
regimes and points to some directions for future research. Hopefully, it is the first of a 









Chapter Two    
 







Defining clear concepts is a fundamental prerequisite for a good research in social sciences  
since one may be a very good researcher by having expectational technical and methodological 
skills and yet remains an ‘unconscious thinker’ if he or she lacks skills in mastering the ‘theory’  





The literature on public social policy and welfare has gone through significant phases of 
research (Myles and Quadagno 2002). While classic studies mostly focus on the emerge 
and evolution of welfare systems in Western democracies such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, the USA and European countries, less attention has been devoted to the research 
of social policy and welfare systems in developing countries and more specifically, to 
social policy interventions in authoritarian context (Mares and Carnes 2009; Forrat 2005).  
This chapter serves as guide for the reader to delve into the comparative social 
policy literature and discuss major theories and approach that have been developed for 
both developed and developing countries. The chapter is organized in four sections. The 
first one presents the evolution of social policy interventions in Europe and its 
relationship to authoritarianism, while the second one discusses the concept of welfare 
state. The third section instead, is devoted to discuss welfare state theories for Western 
democracies - functionalist and neo-Marxist theories, power-resource and institutionalist 
approaches and the globalization school. Lastly, the four section presents different 
approaches to analyse social policy in developing countries. The chapter concludes with 
a paragraph that summarizes the analytical approaches for both developed and developing 
countries and introduces the reader to a new inclusive theoretical framework for the 
research on social policy in non-democratic context. 
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2.1. Social Policy in Historical Perspective and the Legacy of 
Authoritarianism  
 
Scholars in the literature on social policy have long been discussed about the emerge of 
modern welfare state and the introduction of first social policy interventions. Some 
scholars affirm that modern welfare state is of recent origins as the first time the term 
‘welfare state’ was used was to describe the Great Britain’s social policy interventions 
that took place in 1945 (Briggs 1961). Others however, contend that first social services 
were adopted well before the rise of modern welfare state (Paine 2006). In order to better 
understand the evolution of modern social policies, it is therefore very important to pose 
attention to the historical events that led to the implementation of first social policy 
interventions in  in Europe.  
By the end of 16th century, many European governments decided to adopt poor 
relief measures aiming at reducing mounting poverty (Charlesworth 2010). Among 
others, the British Parliament was the first to pass the English Poor Law in 1597 assuring 
that each parish was responsible to maintain its poor inhabitants. Only four years later a 
second law was passed affirming ‘the principle of a compulsory assessment for relief of 
the poor as an essential portion of [England’s] domestic policy’ (Nicholls 1898; Boyer 
1990). The example of the Great Britain however, was subsequently accompanied by 
other European countries. In 1642 the Swedish government adopted the Beggar Law 
which stated that each parish was required to have an alms-house. Religious institutions 
who were formally in charge of taking care of the poor, raising single-child and providing 
support for ill people began to share the responsibility with the state (Charlesworth 2010). 
Between 1525 and 1544, the Netherlands experienced a period of impressive economic 
and population growth and a number of towns that were taking closer control of the 
existing charitable institutions, started to establish first integrated poor relief systems 
(Gunn, Grummitt, and Cools 2007).  
Those forms of social assistance are rudimentary examples of the modern welfare 
state. In fact, it was the advent of the second industrialization in the 18th century that 
created a landmark in the history of social policy. By that time, many people left their 
villages and moved to urban areas where they could find more promising working 
opportunities. Though, together with new jobs, industrial workers had to face new social 
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risks linked to unemployment and sickness. The pressure from the working class on one 
hand, and the duel between the State and the Church as providers of social assistance on 
the other hand, created the conditions for the adoptions of first social insurance programs.  
The Prussian Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, considered as the father of modern 
welfare state, was the first to introduce the concept of ‘social insurance’. (Briggs 1961). 
His Socialpolitik refers to the implementation of three laws: the sickness insurance law 
introduced in 1883, the law on accident insurance adopted in 1884 and the laws on 
disability and old pension in 1889. Despite this new social architecture, the Socialpolitik 
did not contribute to reduce social insecurity and poverty instead, it was only used as a 
political instrument by Bismarck to buy-off some of the revolutionary Social Democrats, 
appease the working class, and ward off the spectre of socialism (Offe 1972). 
With similar political aims in mind, other European countries also established social 
insurance programs. The Austrian stateman Eduard von Taaffe for instance, introduced 
the bill on workers’ sickness insurance in 1888 in order to secure the political support of 
the working class (Jenks 1965). Similarly, the Swedish government formally created its 
modern welfare system with the enactment of the Poor Law in 1847 and the adoption of 
the ‘Poor Relief People’ laws in 1900. These laws created a poor-care system entirely 
managed by the state and separated from the church as well as pension schemes inspired 
by the workers’ insurance introduced in Germany (Edebalk 2009). Few years later similar 
policy measures were also adopted in other countries such as Denmark (1891-1989) and 
Belgium (1984-1903). All of them were aiming at securing political support and reducing 
the spectre of socialism in those countries (Offe 1972). 
 The advent of the First World War brought about drastic changes in economic and 
social architectures. Above all, there was a reformulation of the economic and social 
needs in every nation, especially in relation to policies in education and social assistance  
in both democratic and autocratic regimes. During that time, the state increases its 
dominance in both economic and social life which consequently led to an increase in 
public social spending and the abandon of laissez-faire principles, especially in Western 
economies (Polanyi 1944). Italy and Germany are explanatory cases of this trend. In the 
case of Italy, the advent of fascism initially produced a block in the evolution of welfare 
state. Few years after Mussolini took power in fact, the regime hindered the adoption of 
social insurance against diseases and employment (Cherubini 1977). It adopted 
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discretionary welfare policies favouring the middle-class while at the same time 
damaging the working class and in particular, those workers employed in the agricultural 
sector (Ferrera, Fargion, and Jessoula 2012). It was only with the adoption of  ‘Carta del 
Lavoro’ in 1927 and the formation of a new corporatist state that we witness an expansion 
of social policy commitments. Italy thus increased public spending in social protection 
from 3.9% in 1922 to 5.5% in 1927 and reached 14.4% in 1940 (Ferrera, Fargion, and 
Jessoula 2012). A similar controversial experience in social policy happened in Germany, 
under the National Socialism (Mason 2003). In his book “Social Policy in the Third 
Reich” (1997) Timothy Mason illustrates the importance of social and labour policies 
between 1933 and 1936 for the consolidation of the regime. After dealing with the 
inherited costly and underfinanced welfare system which initially posed serious 
constraints to the regime’s flexibility in the area of social policy, in 1933 Adolf Hitler 
established the German Labour Front and only two years later, he created the German 
Labour Service. In addition, by the mid-1930s Hitler transferred much of the state budget 
to the education sector and introduced the Youth Law that changed the status of Youth 
Associations into State Organizations (Mason 1997). From 1930 to 1936 the Nazi regime 
adopted several employment creation programmes which contributed to increase the level 
of wages and living standards (Mason 1977). On the other hand however, we witness 
increasing investments in heavy industry at the expense of consumer manufacturing and 
working class (De Witt 1978). Thus, Nazi welfare policies had a twofold goal: on one 
hand they served to eliminate economic hardships following the Great Depression and 
increase the living standard of the middle-class while on the other hand, much of the 
public revenues were directed to strategic sectors such as the military. Interestingly then,  
social and labour policies were used by both Italian and German autocratic leaders to 
create a strong and well-structured welfare system aiming at acquiring and maintaining 
public support as well as financing those sectors there were strategic for the survival of 
the regime (Giorgi 2019).  
As Titmuss (1958) and Obinger, Petersen, and Starke (2018) aptly demonstrate, 
there is an intrinsic nexus between wars and welfare. War in fact, impacts on political 
systems by creating the conditions for increasing demand of social protection, fostering 
the state capacity to implement policy reform, re-centralizing state decisions and 
recalibrating power resources in industrial sectors (Obinger, Petersen, and Starke 2018). 
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Hence, the advent of the Second World War created a big pressure on the newly-formed 
welfare systems in Europe. More specifically, the emerge of new social risks linked to 
old-age and sickness together with increasing unemployment levels and the formation of 
a stronger and more organized working-class, contributed to the rise up demand for health 
and social assistance. In order to face those challenges, the government of the Great 
Britain adopted the ‘Beveridge Plan’ in 1944. Different from the Bismarckian model, this 
plan was inspired by universalistic principle and the idea of equal opportunities (Fraser 
1984). The aim of the Beveridge Plan was not to pull-back socialist ideas but to address 
social problems on the road of reconstruction, extend social rights to all segments of 
population and increase solidarity and integration (Kolmar 2007). The Labour party 
eventually adopted the Beveridge report and consequently, implemented new social laws 
such as the National Insurance Act in 1946 and the National Health Service Act 1946. 
Overall, the government crated a welfare system that provided rate universal 
contributions in exchange for flat rate universal benefits (Kolmar 2007). As stated above, 
some scholars conceive 1940s British social policies interventions as the foundation of 
modern welfare state because those policies were based on a central role of the state in 
providing social assistance, health benefits and education services to citizens (Briggs 
1961).  
During the second half of the 20th century however, we witness a reshuffle of 
economic and social life. The post-war prosperity led to an expansion of welfare 
commitments and social spending in all Western countries. The ‘golden age’ of welfare 
states (Esping-Andersen 1994) was characterized by a change in Western countries’ 
traditional welfare systems into more comprehensive systems of universal benefits 
(Quadagno 1987). At the same time however, the collapse of the Soviet Union on one 
hand, and the emerge of new economies on the other, called for a reshuffling of welfare 
state providers. The launch of sweeping economic reforms in South-East Asia countries, 
driven by neo-liberal principles and the expansion of capital markets, reduced the role of 
the state in the social sphere in the favour of market provision (Crone 1993; Hort and 
Kuhnle 2000). Conversely, newly emerged Central Asian countries found themselves 
stuck in the legacy of the Soviet welfare system based on universal principles but 
completely underfinanced (Kulzhanov and Rechel 2006; Akimov and Dollery 2008; 
Buribayev et al. 2016). These political dynamics together with mounting domestic and 
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international pressures on mature welfare state and the transformation of Western 
economies from manufacturing-based to service-based (Pierson 2001) opened the way 
for a new role of social policy in advanced economies. Nowadays, the emerge of private 
actors and the increasing economic and political interdependency among countries in fact, 
asked for a recalibration of welfare state (Hemerijck 2013).  
To sum up, the history of social policy is conceived as a series of events and 
incidents essentially linked by the continuum of time (Gough 1979). This section does 
not aim to provide an exhaustive historical analysis of social policy interventions and 
welfare state formation but it gives us the opportunity to look back at the past and reflect 
on why first measures of health and social assistance were adopted and how they slowly 
transformed into modern welfare state. Interestingly, this historiographic review shows 
that the introduction of first poor relief measures and social insurances in Europe was 
under non-democratic regimes such as Germany with Otto Von Bismarck and Austria 
with Von Taaffe. Those policies were aimed at reducing popular uprising and suppressing 
the spectre of socialism rather than by the social needs of the population and the 
generosity of enlightened leaders (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Thus, it is important to keep in 




2.2. How to Define Social Policy and Welfare State   
 
Before proceeding with a review of the theories on social policy and welfare state, it is 
important to clearly define these two concepts. When talking about social policies, I refer 
to a set of policies adopted by governments to enhance the welfare of their citizens and 
the overall social well-being in the society (Midgley and Livermore 2009) There are many 
ways in which the government can reach this goal. For example, it can provide social 
services to the most vulnerable groups such as old and young people or direct resources 
through income maintenance programs to unemployed and disable groups of people or 
invest in education and health services. Social policies deal with all these aspects of social 
life such as health, housing, education and income (Midgley, Surender, and Alfers 2019). 
The concept of ‘welfare state’ has been widely used to address those policies. Generally, 
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the definition of welfare state can be divided into outcome and output perspectives 
(Green-Pedersen 2004). While the first mostly focuses on the effect of social policies on 
the population (i.e. level of inequality), the latter refers to the type of policy measures 
adopted by governments.   
 According to the outcome-perspective, the term ‘welfare state’ is defined as ‘a state 
in which organized power is deliberately used through politics and administration in an 
effort to modify the play of market forces in three direction: by guaranteeing individuals 
and family a minimum income; by narrowing individuals exposure to social insecurity 
and by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best 
standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services’ (Briggs 1961). 
Following this logic, scholars argue that the aim of the welfare state is to maintain certain 
standards of income, nutrition, health, education and house to every citizens (Wilensky 
1975), provide equal access to social assistance and insurance (Haggard and Kaufaman 
2008) or secure a minimum of welfare to the population and guarantee an adequate 
accumulation of human capital through public investments in health and education 
(Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Overall, the outcome perspective defines welfare state according 
to the policy outcomes produced with health, education and social assistance measures.  
  The outcome perspective was very popular in social policy research until the end 
of the 20th century, when scholars began to question the role of the state as a guarantor of 
citizen’s well-being. On one hand, the centrality of the state in social sectors was slowly 
eroded in favour of neoliberal ideology that drove Western economies to a liberalization 
of social services and the adoption of  ‘market-based’ regulations (Kus 2006). On the 
other hand, neo-Marxist scholars began to criticize the welfare state as an attempt of the 
state to reproduce social classes (Polanyi 1944; Esping-Andersen 1990). In neo-Marxist 
perspective, state intervention is motivated by state’s perceived threat to political and 
social stability rather than the actual social need of the population (Piven and Cloward 
1971). In his path-breaking book ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ Esping-
Andersen (1990) defines welfare state as ‘an agent of social stratification’ and criticizes 
the centrality of the state as well as the ‘welfare-statism’ because he affirms that the state 
is only one of the providers of citizen’s well-being together with social organizations, 
family networks and firms.  
 Based on those criticisms, by the end of the 20th century there has been a shift in 
 
 35 
the definition of welfare state from an outcome perspective to a policy-centred 
perspective which is nowadays the most commonly used approach in the study of social 
policy and welfare (Green-Pedersen 2004). According to the policy-centred approach, 
welfare state is defined by looking at the type of policies implemented by the state to 
respond to social problems linked to sickness, old-age or unemployment together with 
policies in education, health and pension (Spicker 2014). Contrary to the outcome-
perspective, it reflects on which policies should be included in the definition of welfare 
state rather than the resulting outcome. Following this logic, Green-Pedersen (2004) 
defines welfare state as ‘any type of policy that includes cash transfers to households (i.e. 
pensions, unemployment benefits and child allowances) and social services such as health 
care, child care, elder care and social housing as well as education’. Based on this 
definition therefore, welfare state includes different types of social policies stemming 
from health, education and social protection.   
 To sum up, the concept of welfare state is a multi-faceted concept and there is no 
single definition that is a priori better or worse than others (Green-Pedersen 2004) 
Throughout the years and across geographical areas, social policies have changed very 
much and thus, it is an ambitious attempt to identify a single and universal definition of 
welfare state. Here, I define social policies as a series of actual policies and programs 
adopted by the government aiming at improving people’s well-being. The literature offers 
two perspectives that shed light on either the type of policies used by the state (policy-
centred based) and the results of the implementation of those policies (outcome-based). 
In this dissertation, I use a policy-centred perspective to the definition of welfare state for 
two reasons. First, my research question looks at the policy side instead of the outcome. 
I am not in fact, interested in whether social policy expenditures in authoritarian regimes 
reduce the level of inequality but in which factors impinge on the level of social 
expenditure in those contexts. The second reason rests on theoretical grounds. The policy-
centred perspective broadens our understanding of welfare state as it includes any type of 
social policies that deal with health, education and income. In fact, I do believe that by 
focusing only on social protection, we run the risk of excluding other important 





2.3. Theories of  Social Policy and Welfare in Developed  
Economies   
 
In this third part of the chapter I will present the main theories to the study of welfare 
state in developed economies. Those theories constitute the building blocks in the 
literature of social policy as they provide us different lenses of analysis to study  the 
transformations of welfare systems in advanced economies. More specifically, those 
theories include functionalist and power-resource theory, the neo-institutionalist 
approach and globalization studies. 
 
 
2.3.1. Functionalist theories  
 
Functionalist theories use a macro-approach to answer the following research questions: 
What factors account for the expansion of the welfare state that took place in 
industrialized nations between 1950s and 1970s? And what are the consequences of such 
event? As the word ‘functional’ suggests, those theories are grouped in together because 
they conceive the evolution of social policy as a natural and passive response to social 
and economic transformations that took place throughout the 20th century (Gough 1979).  
In fact, they assume that there is no space for political actors and other external factors as 
trigger of welfare development.  
In this subsection I will present the three main functionalist theories based on the 
logic of industrialism, modernization and capitalism. Additionally, special attention is 
dedicated to neo-Marxist approach as it differs from other functionalist theories because 
it criticizes the welfare architecture as a product of modern capitalist society. Finally, 
each paragraph concludes with some of the critics that have been moved to each approach.   
 
Logic of Industrialism  
 
The research on welfare state has long conceived industrialization as a key component of 
the emerge and evolution of modern welfare state (Chris Pierson 2004). More 
specifically, classic studies argue that industrialization produces both the need and 
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conditions for the rise of welfare commitments (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). On the 
supply-side industrialization boosts economic growth and produces the material ground 
for state intervention into social sectors whereas on the demand-side, changes in the 
production system contribute to the emerge of new social risks. Historically the 
impressive economic growth that characterized European countries after the second 
industrial revolution thrusted people to abandon their villages and move to urban cities. 
As a consequence, traditional village-based social security system was eroded because a 
new demand for social protection linked to the risks of unemployment and sickness 
slowly emerged  (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958; Pryor 1968; Kerr, Harbison, and Dunlop 
1960; Pampel and Williamson 1989; Rimlinger 1971). Additionally however, the shift 
from village-based to worked-based protection schemes intensified the vulnerability of 
those groups outside of the labour market such as the old and young (Myles and 
Quadagno 2002).  
More recent studies argue the Post-World War II economic expansion thrusted a 
similar effect. While investigating the structural determinants of social expenditures in 
Europe between 1950s and 1970s, Harold Wilensky’s ‘The Welfare State and Equality’ 
(1975) argues that the post-war economic boom with subsequent demographic and 
bureaucratic changes contributed to the expansion of welfare state in Europe. Wilensky’s 
assumptions rest upon the idea that social programs are influenced by different levels of 
economic development. That is, a better economic performance increases fiscal revenues 
of the state and enhances its capacity to successfully respond to new social demand. A 
stronger version of this theory affirms that industrialization not only triggers welfare 
effort but that similar levels of economic development lead to convergent evolutionary 
paths of social commitments. Scholars supporting the convergence hypothesis argue that 
developed countries benefit from a larger pool of resources and have stronger state 
capacity which eventually lead them to similar levels of welfare effort (Zöllner 1963). 
However, a milder version approach to the logic of industrialism demonstrates that 
countries at similar levels of per capita income diverge very much in their welfare effort 
and other factors such as demographic differences and administrative and organization 
architecture steer policy decisions (Boix 2001; Wilensky 1975).  
Studies based on the logic of industrialism can therefore be divided in two different 
schools of thoughts. On one hand, Zöllner (1963) argues that industrialization is a 
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sufficient and necessary condition for the expansion and convergence of welfare 
commitments in Europe while on the other hand, Wilensky (1975) demonstrates that 
economic development is a necessary condition for the evolution of welfare state in 
Europe but that other factors such as population aging and administrative capacity of the 
state influence the evolution of welfare state. Over the years however, there has been 
many criticisms to the this approach. First, countries that underwent through a process of 
industrialization such as the United Kingdom should have built up a welfare system 
before other country-laggards but as we have seen in the previous section, first welfare 
systems were established in other countries such Germany, Austria and Sweden who later 
experienced a process of industrialization. Second, those theories conceive economic 
performance as the only means to account for welfare state expansion without paying any 
attention to the role of other political factors such as party politics, balance of power 
among political forces as well as different political ideology (Myles and Quadagno 2002). 
As we will see in the following paragraphs, there are plenty of studies that demonstrate 
other factors other than economic development and demographic changes steer trends of 
socials expenditures.  
 
Logic of modernization  
 
Pierson (1991) defines the theories of modernization as “politicized version of the logic 
of industrialism thesis” as it represents a middle-range theory between the logic of 
industrialism and the logic of capitalism. Following the logic of modernization in fact, 
some scholars consider the expansion of social policy as a systematic response to the 
economic and social transformations but they mostly focus on technological changes and 
the expansion of civil rights. More specifically, they argue that functional requirements 
of industrialization create the conditions for the development of the welfare state. Yet, 
different from the logic of industrialism, they highlight the importance of technological 
transformations and civil rights as key determinants of the emerge of welfare state in 
Western democracies. Galbraith (1989) for instance, argues that it was the process of 
technological changes that triggered the adaptation of economic models (with following 
economic growth and larger fiscal revenues) and state structure (with higher levels of 
state capacity and more redistributive benefits) in Europe during the industrial revolution. 
Following a similar logic, Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) consider the welfare state as a 
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result of a “general phenomenon of modernization”. That is, they stress the importance 
of production and technological changes and combines them with political 
modernization, state tradition and welfare capitalism. 
A second contribution to the logic of modernization supports the idea that the 
welfare state eliminates the essential causes of class struggle and democratizes popular 
access to the state (Esping-Andersen 1990). The work of T.H. Marshall “Citizenship and 
Social Class”(1963) supports this idea and bridges the logic of modernization with the 
logic of capitalism. More specifically, he argues that civil rights developed alongside with 
the dissolution of feudalism and the emergence of capitalism. While feudal contract 
between a lord and a vassal preserves the a class-based system where each individual 
cannot overcome his own status but at the same time retains his own undertakings, a new 
political and economic system that emerged after the Second World War is based on a 
contract that is ‘an agreement between men who are free and equal in status but not 
necessary in power’ (Marshall 1963, pp.34). Therefore, Central to the logic of a capitalist 
system is the illusion of equality achieved through the expansion of civil rights in world 
of mounting social and economic inequality. In this view social policies are linked to the 
expansion of civil rights but they are functional to the development of capitalism.  
 
“The Poor Law was also an aid, not a menace, to capitalism because it 
relieved industry of all social responsibility outside the contract of 
employment while sharpening the edge of competition of labour market” 
(Marshall 1964, pp.35)  
 
Overall, the modernization approach conceives socio-economic development as a 
necessary conditions for the creation and development of welfare state and thus, only 
industrialized and urbanized societies eventually adopt social insurance system (Flora and 
Alber 1981). Yet, the triggers of welfare state - technological transformations and 
expansion of civil rights – are only functional to the consolidation of capitalism. With the 
benefit of hindsight, those theories does not fully explain the emerge of welfare 
commitments in Latin America (1970s-1980s) and East Asia  (1980s-1990s). Some 
countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Taiwan and Singapore for instance experienced 
a tremendous economic growth during since 1980s which were followed by an expansion 
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of social commitments (Haggard and Kauffman 2008) . Yet, despite the development and 
reform of social policy among middle-income countries, we witness no enlargement of 
civil rights in countries such as Taiwan and Singapore. Therefore, the logic of 
modernization does not fully explain the emerge of welfare state outside of the Western 
cluster.  
 
Logic of capitalism and neo-Marxist theories 
 
Socio-economic transformations are not separate from the way in which economic 
activities are organized. As we have seen before, industrialization and civil rights are 
linked to a new system of production. Proponents of the logic of capitalism affirm that 
there is a strong relationship between the emerge and development of capitalism as a 
system of production and accumulation of capital and the expansion of welfare 
commitments (Jessop 2002). As other functionalist theories, it conceives the evolution of 
social policy as a natural response to socio-economic transformations yet, it differs from 
them as it argues that the history of social policy is intertwined with the history of 
capitalism and therefore the development of the welfare state is seen as a response to the 
need of advanced industrial capitalism (Gough 1979; P. Pierson 2000). More specifically, 
the logic of capitalism posit that “welfare state is a feature that is present in all advanced 
capitalist countries” (Gough 1978) and therefore industrialist together with advanced 
capitalism are the both necessary conditions for the rise of welfare systems. 
The pioneering work of Esping-Andersen ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism’ (1990) argues that ‘the mainsprings of modern social policy lie in the process 
by which both human needs and labour power became commodities’. More specially, he 
affirms that social policy already existed prior to modern capitalism but capitalism 
transforms social need into a new type of commodities that can be sell and buy as other 
commodities (Esping-Andersen 1990). The welfare state therefore become a system of 
stratification with an active role in ordering social relations. The process of de-
commodification of social needs is very well explained by Karl Polanyi in his  book  ‘The 
Great Transformation’ (1944).  He recalls the history of modern society to demonstrate 
that the rise of market-economies is intertwined with social and political transformations 
that took place at the end of XX century. That is, the development of a market system 
based on the idea of self-regulation had profoundly influenced not only the system of 
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production but also domestic and international political equilibria. Tradition of modern 
economic thought sustained the idea that a self- regulated market which adjusts itself 
through the price mechanism would produce material welfare. As a consequence, the state 
should intervene only to pose remedy to market failures. That is, welfare state is justified 
only in the absence of market equilibria. Polanyi criticises classical liberal theories and 
identifies a fundamental contradiction in the laissez-faire capitalism to entirely 
commodify labour power. The commodification of labour power and social needs helps 
capitalism to reproduce itself  while at the same time sows the seed for its own self-
destruction (Polanyi 1944).   
Following a similar logic, neo-Marxist scholars strongly criticise welfare state as a 
by-product of advanced capitalist societies. By comparing the United States and 
European countries, Claus Offe (1972) demonstrates how those countries, although 
among the wealthiest economies in the world, are associated with a large proportion of 
people who starve and suffer. Policy makes are more driven by the idea of composite 
those who are ‘victims’ of capitalism rather than pursuing the political goal towards 
universal welfare.  This demonstrates that the logic of capital accumulation and industrial 
growth coexists with the logic of unmet human needs and the services of welfare state are 
meagre compensation for the new problems arising with industrial growth and social-
demographic transformation. Moreover,  the historical development of welfare state 
follows the political goals of  “compensation” and ‘offset’ capitalist problems rather than 
the path of improvement and the widening of life chances.  
 
“Welfare state is more accurately defined as “capitalism for the poor, 
and socialism for the rich. Rather than ‘creeping socialism’,  it [welfare 
state] is the most generous underwriter of large business enterprises in 
capitalism’s short but glorious history’ (Offe 1972) 
 
To sum up, the logic of capitalism argues that welfare state can been as both a state 
response to capitalist failures and as an important achievement of the working-class. This 
contradiction lies at the heart of the nature of capitalism itself. That is, capitalism 
increases industrial production, triggers economic growth and creates new jobs while at 
the same time, causes new social risk, destroys traditional family support and produces a 
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new mass of unemployed people. Similarly, the welfare state has intrinsically both 
negative and positive features (Gough 1978). On one hand, the welfare state helps 
capitalism to reproduce itself because if left on its own, free market would destroy its 
own foundations (Polanyi 1944). On the other hand, it poses social control over market 
forces and helps to compensate the population for the commodification of labour power.  
Overall however, there are two major critics to the functionalist approach. First, at 
the theoretical ground, it is a deterministic theory. Scholars in fact, neglect the importance 
of actors, policy makers, ideologies and institutions outside of the economic world. 
Functionalist theories, in fact look at the welfare state as response to the system of 
advanced capitalism and leave no or very little space for actors, policy makers, ideologies 
and institutions in the development of welfare. As Offe points out, “the development of 
welfare state seems to be immune to ideological chatter” and “neither the dynamics of 
bureaucracy nor human impotency vis-à-vis political problems lies at the root of welfare 
problems. Rather, the inherent, institutional constraints of a capitalist economy confound 
every effort of the welfare state to solve its internal difficulties”. 
Second, the in terms of methodology, functionalist theories are based on quantitative 
and large-N studies which look at the level of social expenditures to account for the 
development of welfare state. Yet, as Esping-Andersen points out (1990), social 
expenditures are ‘epiphenomenal to the theorical substance of welfare state’ and thus it 
would be more complete to include small-n studies or use other policy indications such 
as social policy coverage or the level of poverty and inequality to answer the questions 
of what drives the emerge of welfare state in western democracies. 
 
 
2.3.2. The Power Resource Approach  
 
With the end of the economic boom and the decline of social spending in the 1990s, the 
research on welfare state moves to a different turn. Scholars of a new generation were 
interested in accounting for variations rather than expansion of welfare commitments. 
More specifically they aimed to answer the question ‘Why do industrialized economies 
produce different systems of social protection and social insurance?’ (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008). Representatives of this new school of thought found that economic and 
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financial pressures do not translate directly into welfare state outcomes. Rather, politics 
mediates the effects of economics on welfare, determines the shape of expenditure cuts 
and how they are turned into distributive outcomes (Cook 2007) More specifically, they 
assume that distribution of power among political actors and institutional architecture 
account for variations of welfare spending in capitalist democracies (Myles and 
Quadagno 2002).   
The first theory of welfare state using a ‘politics matter’ approach is the power 
resource theory which emphasises the rule of elections, political parties and labour 
organizations. More specifically, this theory rests on the assumption that distribution of 
power between left parties and labour organizations on one hand and central-right wing 
parties and business groups on the other determine differences in the size and distribution 
of welfare state across countries  (Stephens 1979; Korpi and Palme 2003). Among others, 
Gerhardt Lenski (1966) was one of the first to demonstrate that formal institution of 
parliamentary democracy such as universal suffrage and free and competitive elections 
together with the ability of workers to organize in political and social groups generate 
different redistributive outcomes. Follow a similar way of reasoning, Christopher Hewitt 
(1977) argues that democracy is conductive of more egalitarian redistributive 
programmes only if lower classes use their votes to elect class-based parties that represent 
the working-class interest. Additionally, in 1983 Walter Korpi supports the idea that 
major differences in welfare state spending and entitlements among the capitalist 
democracies is explained by looking at the type pf political party in power. That is, in 
countries where left parties, such as Social Democratic parties, govern aligned with strong 
trade unions, it is reasonable to see an expansion of welfare state spending and 
entitlements whereas in countries where corporate organizations and central-right wing 
political forces we should expect a contraction of welfare spending (Korpi 1985).  
The power-resource theory remained predominant throughout the 1980s, until some 
Western democracies experienced a political reshuffle in their party organization. With 
right wing parties taking power in the United States and the United Kingdom, the power 
resource theory was questioned. Some scholars in particular criticized it as it underplayed 
the role of the state in shaping social programs and the expansion of welfare state 
(O’Connor and Olsen 1998). In addition, scholars emphasize the effect of electoral 
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institutions and party competitions over party politics positions and ideology 
(Häusermann, Picot, and Geering 2013).  
 
 
2.3.3. Neo-Institutionalist and Polity-Centered Approach 
 
Built on these critics, in 1990s the research on social policy and welfare shifted from a 
society-based to an institutional-based approach focusing mostly on institutional features 
in Western democracies (Myles and Quadagno 2002). This new neo-Weberian ‘state-
centred’ theory brings back the state as an active provider of social assistance and benefits 
and argues that together with the administrative systems and bureaucracies, the state is an 
important actor in the evolution of social policy (Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Immergut 
1990; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993).  
Following this logic, historical institutionalists argue that early developments of state 
structures limit the range of alternatives for future policies (Thelen 1999). Therefore, 
social policies are ‘locked in’ on a particular path of development which makes it difficult 
for various stakeholders to reform or retrench the already implemented programs. 
Institutions are deeply-rooted in the society and therefore changes is quite rare. While 
studying social policy in United States, Theda Skocpol (1992) argues that change in 
welfare state is mostly produced by unexpected events rather than an evolutionary pattern 
since institutions do not easily change.  
The neo-institutionalist perspective therefore brings back the central role of the state 
and the institutional features of government as determinants of policy choices. This 
approach was particularly prominent among scholars comparing social policy in the 
United States with European countries in order to assess whether and how the institutional 
differences impinge on social policy decisions (Skocpol 1992). Those studies emphasize 
the importance of a centralized policy-making process together with insulation of the 
executive from parliamentary and electoral process (Immergut 1990), the party discipine 
in reducing interst groups pressures (Maioni 1998) and the role of corporatist decision-
making structures in producing a state response to social needs (Huber, Ragin, and 
Stephens 1993).  
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The neo-institutionalist approach has acquired increasing attention in the comparative 
social welfare research over the last years of the 20th century (O’Connor and Olsen 1998). 
In contrast to the society-centred approach which emphases the role of elections and the 
aggregation of political interests from below, the neo-institutionalist approach highlights 
the organization and structure of state institutions (Skocpol 1996).  
Overall the ‘politics matters’ approach adds a new important dimension to the 
research on social policy and welfare: it does not consider only the ‘generosity’ of welfare 
(i.e. social spending) but also the ‘extension’ of it by looking at the core principles behind 




2.3.4. The Role of Globalization 
 
Since the 1990s, scholars have been engaged in an intense debate over the nexus between 
economic globalization and welfare state (Genschel 2004). The collapse of the Soviet 
Union shifted public attention towards the dangers connected with the triumph of 
capitalism and the consequent increasing internationalization of the economies were 
seized on as particular causes of concern. Many scholars in fact believe that the 
globalization of markets has left no choice for governments but to pursue neoliberal 
policies (Garrett 1998). ‘Good government’ became synonymous of ‘market-friendly 
government’ and the global competition left no room for leftist economic policy 
alternatives (Garrett 1998). While investigating the tension between the role of national 
governments and economic globalization, Layna Mosley (2005) demonstrates that 
economic globalization affect countries in different ways. More specifically, she argues 
that not all countries suffer from the negative effects of economic openness instead, 
national governments still retain ‘room to move’. To date, there are three different schools 
of thought  that analyse the effect of globalization on welfare state (Genschel 2004).  
The ‘globalist school’ argues that the welfare state is subjected to market pressures 
that stem from increasing international competition. This competition limits the 
effectiveness of the welfare state and produces a convergence around the minimalist 
welfare state structure (Swank 2002). Since national government cannot control capital 
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mobility anymore, they have no room of manoeuvre to implement national monetary 
policy that could balance the economy in negative periods. As a consequence, intense 
international competition reduces state ability to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
that are more effective and less costly. With its hands tied, the state has no other 
alternative but to reduce the amount of resources allocated to social services and therefore 
retrenchment of welfare state is inevitable (Cerny 1995; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000).  
 Instead, the second school – ‘globalization sceptics’– supports the idea that although 
globalization of capitals has undermined the autonomy of the state in both fiscal and 
monetary policy, it does not impinge on its capacity to finance public spending (Genschel 
2004). Over the past twenty years in fact, public spending in Western democracies has 
not universally decreased whereas we have witnessed different trajectories of social 
spending. Genschel (2004) and  Rodrik (1998) for instance, argue that the welfare state 
continues to provide ample social insurance against international market risks as well as 
compensation to those who lose from international competition. Therefore, globalization 
alone does not have any real effects on the welfare state: the welfare state remains a 
distinctive elements of modern societies and cross-national differences survive as there 
can be other alternatives to the free market capitalism (Garrett 1998). 
The representatives of the last school of thought believe that the problems of the 
welfare state are self-inflicted. Globalization is a consequence of inner problems of 
welfare arrangements. Economic openness and welfare state issues are connected but the 
correlation has the opposite direction that the one supported by the globalist school. In 
the late 1970s, a decline in the economic growth has produced a massive shift from 
employment to manufacturing activities. This shift has contributed to lower productivity 
levels which in turns translated into an even sharper decline of economic growth. The 
inability of the state to stimulate economic growth has produced an increase in the 
unemployment levels and a decline in the real wages (Pierson 1998). Welfare state 
problems are therefore linked to the type of economic model implemented and 
globalization of trade, services and people is only the consequence of inherited problems 
of those economic models. 
To sum up, there is a broad and solid literature that sheds light on the condition under 
which welfare state and social policy emerged in western democracies. Functionalist 
theories look at the process of industrialization, technological change and civil rights as 
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the engine of social policy and welfare. Those theories very well explain the emerge of 
welfare state in Europe, the United States and Canada after the Second World War. Yet, 
they fail to address the issue of different evolutionary patters. On the other hand, the 
‘politics matter’ approach that includes the power-resource theory and the neo-
institutionalist perspective, gives more attention to the institutional setting, the 
aggregation of preferences and the concentration of political power as key factors for the 
classification of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Lastly, a new politics of 
welfare state takes into account the effect of an increasing interconnected world where 
financial and economic globalization seems not to leave any space for the state.  
 
 
2.4. Social Policy in Developing Countries   
So far this chapter has reviewed only theories of welfare state development and social 
policy interventions in developed economies. Over the last decades however, more 
attention has been devoted to social policy dynamics in Latin America (Brown and Hunter 
2004; Cruz-Martinez 2017; Franzoni 2008; Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 2017; Altman and 
Castiglioni 2009) Central and South-East Asia (Ibrahimov et al. 2010; Bercuson 1995; 
Singh and Laurila 1999; Lim 2005; Buribayev et al. 2016; Amagoh and Bhuiyan 2010; 
Aizhan and Saipinov 2014; Hill 2013) and Africa countries (Eibl 2020; Gumede 2018; 
Cassani and Carbone 2016; Amoah 2020). Those contributions call for new approaches 
in the research on  social policy in developing contexts (Forrat 2005; Mares and E. Carnes 
2009). Hence, this fourth section of the chapter reviews the current state of the art in the 
research on social policy and welfare in developing economies. Initially, I introduce 
theories based to the diffusion of ideas and best practices among countries. Scholars in 
fact, demonstrate that ideas stemming from cultural legacy and international 
organizations are very powerful instruments in steering policy decisions, especially in the 
developing world. Then, I discuss the impact of regime type and  democratization process 
on welfare systems in Latin America and South-East Asia. The last two sub-sections 
review the “power constellation theory” in the Latin American studies and present new 
approaches based on actors’ interests and policy preferences which have been quite 
influential in the public policy literature.  
 
 48 
2.4.1. Policy Diffusion Theories  
 
 
With the exception of the theories on globalization, all the theories that we have discussed 
for developed economies highlight the importance country’s domestic factors such as 
economic performance, institutions and the distribution of power. Yet, contemporary 
public policy analysis contends that policy decisions are also influenced by the diffusion 
of ideas and best practices among countries. Some scholars posit that the way in which 
leaders perceive problems and the kind of policy solutions they adopt is affected by the 
relationship among countries as well as by the international context (Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2006). Based on this argument, Beland (2007) posits that “understanding the 
effect of ideas and assumptions on the social and economic world is essential for 
explaining the way in which these actors can bring about changes in one policy area”.  
More specifically, the diffusion approach argues that political and economic 
interdependencies among political systems influence country’s policy-making process 
and the subsequent policy decisions (Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013). Policy diffusion 
is defined as “the process by which policy choices in one country affect the policy choices 
in other countries” (Meseguer and Gilardi 2009, 528). After an initial discussion in the 
work of Collier and Messick (1975), the diffusion approach has become an important 
strand of analysis in the welfare state research (Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013; 
Kuhlmann et al. 2020). Much of the attention is devoted to the ways in which ideas can 
influence policy decisions. Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke (2013) for instance, identify four 
different types of mechanisms – learning, emulation, competition and coercion – that lead 
to policy diffusion. Importantly, each type of mechanism depends on some conditional 
factors such as the geographical location, ideological positions of central political actors, 
type of economic system and the legacy to pre-existing policies  (Obinger, Schmitt, and 
Starke 2013).  
For many years the bulk of the contributions has been on western democracies and 
on the coercive power of European Union (Kuhlmann et al. 2020; Meseguer and Gilardi 
2009; Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013). Yet, since the end of the 20th century, we 
witness a  rise of the diffusion approach in the research on social policy in developing 
countries. This shift is linked to the evidence that first form of social policy programs 
were present in poor countries outside of the Western hemisphere well before 
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industrialization took place (Esping-Andersen 1994). The absence of material and 
political conditions which, according to the functionalist theories, should trigger welfare 
expansion, has shifted scholars’ attention to other potential co-founders of social policy 
development.    
Nowadays, there is an abundant literature that looks at the role of ideas in the 
developing world. Some scholars contend that one way through which policy ideas were 
diffused in the Global South is through colonialism. Midgley (1984) for instance, argues 
that missionaries and religious charities fostered the diffusion of Western welfare 
practices and European social services to their colonies which in many cases, still 
perpetuate the same colonial social practices and services, despite the de-colonization 
period. Other scholars however contends that ideas have been spread in developing 
countries through international organizations and geographical proximity (Armingeon 
2007). Many contributions in fact, point to the role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) as pivotal 
actor in addressing social policy decisions in Latin America and South-East Asia 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Betz and Neff 2017; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Mok 
and Kühner 2017; Zhang and Zhu 2019; Gu 2016) Among others, Weyland (2005) 
demonstrates that the spread of pension privatization in Latin America was mostly driven 
by regional concentration and neighbour effects. He argues that policymakers cannot 
avoid to consider social reforms in neighbouring countries as the effect of those policies 
are immediately available and they often have a regional impact.  
Overall, the diffusion approach for social policy in developing countries pinpoints to 
the role of ideas and best practices that diffused through, colonial heritage, international 
organizations and regional proximity. Nowadays, those factors are considered as main 
driver of social policy reforms in Latin American and South-East Asian countries. 
Contrary to functionalist theories, the diffusion approach helps us to explain why and 
how countries that do not underwent through a period of industrialization ended up to 
adopt social services and practices. Additionally, it also provides a new lens of analysis 
to the evolution of the social policy that distances itself from the rational-based 
perspective and looks at imitation mechanisms. However, one shortcoming of this 
approach is that it can hardly explain divergence in social welfare systems among 
neighboured countries. Especially in the case of non-democratic regimes, diffusion 
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mechanisms may lead to policy convergence in some cases but sometimes, policy 
decisions are taken according to domestic structure factors or simply in the interests of a 




2.4.2. Regime Type and Democratization Process 
 
 
It is very common practice in the research on social policy in developing countries to look 
at the effect of regime type and democratization on policy decisions. Scholars conducting 
regional studies in fact, very often include regime type as a control variable in their 
analysis (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Lake and Baum 2001; Przeworski et al. 
2000; Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 2017; Brown and Hunter 2004). Those studies 
demonstrate that democracy is associated with more pressions for redistribution and 
higher levels of social spending compared to non-democratic regimes as electoral 
competition (Przeworski et al. 2000), a bigger size of the franchise  (Lindert 2004) and 
interest-groups mobilization (Haggard and Kaufman 2008) create a more inclusive 
policy-making process and a favourable institutional context for the implementation of 
social policy decisions. Non-democratic regimes instead, are associated with lower levels 
of social expenditures because the decision making process here is hierarchical and 
strictly top-down and thus, actors outside of the political arena do not get access the policy 
process. As a result, some scholars argue that policy commitments in non-democratic 
regimes are more limited (Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 2017; Brown and Hunter 2004; 
Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008).  
However, there are several reasons to contradict this argument.First, nondemocratic 
regimes in Europe were among the first to adopt social insurance legislation and support 
the expansion of social programs under conditions of limited suffrage – see Bismarck in 
Germany and von Taafe in Austria (Mares and E. Carnes 2009). Esping-Andersen (1990, 
p. 15) also posits that “the thesis that democracy leads to larger welfare states confronts 
the historical oddity that the first major welfare state initiatives occurred prior to 
democracy”. Second, Mares and Carnes (2009) demonstrate that among developing 
countries worldwide a large number of social insurance programs were adopted by non-
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democratic governments. Similarly, Knutsen and Rasmussen (2018) show that 
authoritarian regimes are not immune to policy pressures and they are not less likely than 
democracies to adopt old-age pension schemes.  
Overall, the research on the effect of regime type on social policy decisions is quite 
controversial. On one hand, scholars argue a hierarchical decision making process in 
authoritarian regimes reduces the incentives for the leaders to implement social policies 
compared to democracies that have a more widespread and better financed welfare system  
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Haggard and Kaufinan 2020). On the other 
hand, some scholars contend that autocracies are not immune to distributive pressures 
and, on net, they are not associated with lower social spending compared to democracies  
(Mulligan and Gil 2002; Mares and E. Carnes 2009; Knutsen and Rasmussen 2018). I 
believe that to overcome the controversial effect of regime type on social policy decisions, 
we should look at political regimes not as static building-blocks but as institutions that 
transform over time. In this regard, democratization studies help us to better understand 
different dynamics of social policy in the Global South. 
The third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991b) brought about many 
countries in Latin America and Central and South-East Asia to transit to a democratic 
regime. Over years, the democratization process has attracted scholars attention to 
investigate whether this process has been accompanied by a vigorous change in countries’ 
welfare systems. Among others, Boix (2003) argues that economic development and 
social policies sustain democratization. Countries with higher per capita income tend to 
have higher level of social spending. In addition, better economic performance triggers 
democratization process which in turn, indirectly lead to expansion of social programs. 
Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) demonstrate that regime transformation made a 
difference in the development of welfare systems in Latin American and East Asian 
countries as democratization triggered political competition and social expenditure.  
Those studies provide a more comprehensive understanding on the relationship 
between regime type and social policy. By looking at the dynamics of regime 
transformation, scholars demonstrate that the process of democratization rather than the 
regime type per se plays a pivotal role in developing more inclusive and better financed 
welfare systems. Nonetheless, democratization studies do not address variation in both 
democratic and autocratic regimes. Those studies in fact assume that regime 
 
 52 
transformation may only incur from autocracy and democracy and do not consider the 
extensive variation that exists across both autocracy and democracy. The next chapter 
deals with this problem and makes an additional step towards the elaboration of the 
theoretical framework.   
 
 
2.4.3. Power Constellation Theory   
 
The attention to the regime type and democratization processes has considerably 
improved our understanding on social policy dynamics in the developing world. Yet, 
this approach has proved to be less useful in explaining cross-national variations in 
policy outputs among non-democratic regimes (Mares and E. Carnes 2009). Democracy 
and autocracy provide different playgrounds where political actors interact and take 
decisions on whether and how allocate money to social sectors. Yet, the relationship 
among members of the ruling coalition or between the leader and his population may 
vary substantially in those regimes. As we have seen for developed countries, the 
distribution of power between different groups shape the interaction across different 
actors as well as subsequent policy decisions (Korpi 1985). Built on these assumptions, 
Huber and Stephens (2012) develop a new theoretical framework to explain the 
development of social policy in Europe and in Latin America: the Power Constellation 
Theory . This theory looks at the power relations in three separate arena: domestic, state 
international arena. In the domestic levels, the power is distributed between different 
classes and political parties. Huber and Stephens (2012) show for instance, that Latin 
American countries led by social democratic parties developed more quickly and more 
extensive social services compared to other countries governed by Christian democratic 
parties. At the state level instead, the authors argue that the concentration of power 
between the state and the population impact on the formation of a welfare state. Based 
on the work of Immergut (1990), they posit that the capacity of the state to effectively 
implement social programs and the presence of veto points offer different opportunities 
for groups outside of the ruling coalition to initiate welfare reforms. Finally, similarly 
to the diffusion approach, they highlight the importance of international constellations 
of power and the liberalization of capital markets on welfare state formation.  
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Overall, power constellation theory provides an additional step in the analysis of social 
policies in developing countries by looking at how the distribution of power across 
different social classes shape social policy decisions. Clearly, this theory builds on the 
power-resource theory that I discussed in the previous section (Korpi 1985) but it adds 




2.4.4. Policy Preferences and Actors’ Interests 
 
All the approaches there were discussed so far investigate social policy dynamics by 
adopting a state-perspective. However, as Esping-Anderson rightly put it (1990), the state 
is only one of the providers of social policy since there are other actors that invest in 
education and provide health and social assistance (Gough 2013). In particular, the public 
policy literature highlights how individual actors’ preferences and economic and social 
interests may influence policy decisions.  
A masterpiece in the research on the relationship between actors’ preferences and 
policy decisions is the work of  Meltzer and Richard (1981). According to the median 
voter’s theorem, government spending and taxes depends on the preferences and demand 
for redistribution of the median voter. In the case of democracies, the general equilibrium 
between government size and redistributive policies is conditional upon the presence of 
a majoritarian voting system which allows the vote with median income among 
enfranchised citizens to be decisive. However, the authors conclude that this equilibrium 
can be reached also in non-democratic contexts where the decisive individual may be a 
dictator, a monarch or a member of the military juntas. Following a similar logic, other 
scholars pinpoint to the preferences of leaders (Thomas and Grindle 1990; Yoshimatsu 
2012), interest groups (Böhmelt 2015; Klimovich and Thomas 2014; Purcell 1973) and 
international organizations (Rondinelli, McCullough, and Johnson 1989; Andrews 2013; 
Béland and Orenstein 2013; Queisser 2000) in shaping patterns of social expenditures in 
developing countries.  
Another strand of research instead, pinpoints to leader’ interests in increasing levels 
of public social expenditure. Some scholars in fact argue that governments in the 
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developing countries tend to implement new policies in health and education as they 
expect higher social and political rate of return as well as to secure their position in power. 
Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson (2002) for instance, demonstrate that spending in health 
and education is justified by autocrats’ interests to create better social conditions for their 
citizens which in turns, reduce the probability of  being overthrown. Similarly, Cassani 
(2017) demonstrates that authoritarian governments use social services as instruments to 
legitimize their position in power. That is, leaders adopt new measures of social assistance 
as a way to secure their position in power. 
As the power-constellation theory demonstrates, academic contributions on actors’ 
preferences and interests highlight the importance of domestic dynamics while studying 
social policy in developing countries. While a state-centered perspective explains 
variations in social policy by looking at changes in economic structures and institutions, 
those theories demonstrate that actors’ preferences and interests shape the evolution of 
welfare system, especially in non-democratic regimes.  
 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks  
Comparative social policy literature has gone through significant phases of research. For 
many years, there has been lots of attention to the emerge and evolution of welfare state 
in Western democracies. Though, recent contributions challenge the western-perspective 
and provide new and stimulating approaches to the study of social policy and welfare in 
developing countries.  
  In this chapter, I conduct a brief historical analysis on the introduction of first social 
policy measures and then, I review the most important theories of social policy and 
welfare for both developed and developing countries. Overall, the chapter points out two 
important take-home points.  
 First, the literature on social policy and welfare is vast and abundant. Since the 
adoption of the first poor relief measures in the 17th century, scholars have produced 
different theories and approaches to explain variations in social policy decisions and 
welfare state architecture across time and space. Yet, the literature also shows that there 
is no single theory that, alone, can account for the overall evolutionary dynamics of social 
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policy. Each theory gives us one lens of analysis to study such dynamics though, as we 
have seen throughout the chapter, those theories have also substantial drawbacks. Built 
on this evidence, I believe that a better way to investigate social policy dynamics is to 
include different lenses of analysis in the elaboration of a theoretical framework. In doing 
so, the next chapter includes several economic and political factors that I hypothesize 
would explain patterns of social expenditure in authoritarian regimes.  
 Second, this review shows that there is an old and strong bond between social policy 
and authoritarianism. For many years the literature on social policy has been focused on 
democracies but authoritarian regimes have always adopted social policy measures. What 
is more, modern welfare state was born under conditions of authoritarianism. The 
comparative social policy literature and in particular, recent academic contributions on 
the relationship between regime types and social policy decisions comprehensibly 
demonstrate that regime type is an important factor to should be taken into account when 
studying social policy. However, those contributions do not provide sufficient attention 
to the variation that exists across authoritarian regimes. For this reason, this dissertation 
has the ambition to fill this gap by shedding light on the dynamics of authoritarianism 





















Public Spending in Authoritarian Regimes: A 






The research program on social policy needs to broaden its horizon beyond the democratic 
cases, to consider whether the benefits of democracy hold, if not why not, and under which 
conditions authoritarian regimes may be responsive to the interests of the poor. 







In this chapter, I elaborate on the theoretical framework and main hypotheses used to 
study patterns of public health and education expenditure in authoritarian regimes. As 
shown in Chapter 2, the literature on social policy is quite vast, although limited attention 
has been paid to authoritarian welfare systems. When elaborating on the theoretical 
framework and main hypotheses, I draw on previous contributions to social policy 
analysis and the research on authoritarian regimes. Preliminary empirical evidence is used 
to elaborate on the hypotheses about the identified determinants and their effects on 
patterns of public spending in authoritarian regimes. To this end, I take into account 
factors that influence both the supply and demand for social spending. 
The theoretical framework aims to provide a twofold contribution to the literature 
on welfare states and authoritarian regimes. First, it lays out a comprehensive approach 
to study social policy dynamics outside of democratic clusters. In doing so, it combines 
factors that have been widely used to study social policy in democratic regimes with the 
constitutive elements of authoritarianism. Second, I postulate that institutions in 
authoritarian regimes are not mere window dressing; they influence the stability of the 
regime and the type of policy that is implemented (Gandhi 2008a; 2008b; Gandhi and 
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Przeworski 2007). Relying on these assumptions, I develop a typology of authoritarian 
regimes that sheds light on different types of institutions and their effects on social 
spending.  
The chapter is organised into two sections, each of which develops different 
hypotheses according to two macro-approaches. The first section presents the 
hypothesised effect of economic determinants, such as economic performance and 
structure, on policy decisions. These factors have been widely used in the study of social 
policy in Western economies. Yet, very little attention has been devoted to the effects of 
those factors in authoritarian contexts. Furthermore, based on preliminary empirical 
evidence, I hypothesise that the relationship between economic performance and public 
spending in authoritarian regimes strongly depends on natural resource endowment. 
Thus, I assume that the production of natural resources, such as oil and gas, would 
impinge upon government size. The second part of the chapter focuses on the political 
and institutional determinants of public spending. As shown in the Introduction, 
authoritarian regimes differ among themselves as much they differ from democracies 
(Geddes 1999). This section analyses in more detail the extensive variation across 
authoritarian regimes by focusing on the size of the winning coalition and formal 
institutions, such as elections and party competitions. While economic determinants 
affect the resources that each autocrat can tap into, both coalition size and formal 
institutions determine the need and incentives for autocrats to distribute resources. 
Finally, the last section takes into account the strength of potential opposition groups and 
their ability to influence policy decision-making. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of the theoretical assumptions and main hypotheses. 
 
 
3.1. Economic Determinants  
 
 
In this section, I describe the mechanisms and effects of three economic factors on 
patterns of public spending on health and education in non-democratic contexts: the 
country’s (1) economic development, (2) natural resource endowment and (3) economic 
openness. As noted in the previous chapter, the research on social policy takes into 
account at least one of these factors while analysing the evolutionary patterns of welfare 
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efforts in both developed and developing countries. Thus, it is very common for social 
policy scholars to use one indicator that refers to either economic development or 
openness of the country in their studies. Preliminary evidence and theoretical 
assumptions, however, suggest that the relationship between economic performance and 
allocation of public expenditure is influenced by other factors. The rentier state theory, 
for instance, demonstrates that whether countries rely on the production or exports of 
natural resources directly affects a country’s economic performance and indirectly 
influences policy decisions.  
This section is organised in a cumulative way. Initially, each paragraph presents the 
theoretical assumptions drawn from the comparative social policy literature, and then 
preliminary empirical evidence is presented to test whether those assumptions hold true 
in authoritarian contexts. The resulting hypotheses stem from both theoretical reasoning 
and initial empirical evidence. Importantly, the empirical analysis conducted in this 
chapter does not aim to provide exhaustive evidence on such a relationship, but to provide 




3.1.1. Economic Development  
 
 
Functionalist theories in the welfare state literature assume that changes in economic 
structure and socio-demographic characteristics influence the allocation of public goods 
in social sectors. Those studies aptly demonstrate that processes of industrialisation and 
urbanisation created the conditions for the expansion of welfare commitments in the 
second half of the 20th century and led to the golden age of the European welfare state 
(Wilensky 1975; Cutright 1965; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Pampel and Williamson 
1989)  
Following this logic, it is possible to identify two mechanisms that relate economic 
development to the size of governments in Western democracies. First, changes in the 
production system increase the amount of goods and services at the government’s 
disposal. As the classic Solow-Swan growth model shows, a more efficient production 
system increases a country’s economic performance and, all other economic and political 
conditions being equal, leads to an expansion of public activities over private ones (Solow 
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1970). Better economic performance creates the conditions for higher levels of social 
public spending in developed economies because those sectors attract more than two-
thirds of governments’ budget5. Second, the demand for collective goods, such as health 
and education, is income-elastic and therefore increases as income grows (Wagner 1883; 
Segura-Ubiergo 2007). One example of such a relationship occurred with the emergence 
of the working class and improvement in living conditions by the end of the 19th century, 
which prompted an increase in the demand for state intervention to cover new social risks 
linked to unemployment, old age and sickness (Briggs 1961; Hay 1993). In short, 
economic performance has both direct and indirect effects on public expenditure. On one 
hand, it increases the amount of resources at governments’ disposal, and on the other 
hand, it stimulates demand for state intervention. Overall, better economic performance 
increases the size of the public sector compared to the private one and induces higher 
levels of social spending. 
 Based on this logic, recent contributions demonstrate the pivotal role of economic 
development in the social spending of developing countries (Altman and Castiglioni 
2019; Cruz-Martinez 2017; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Przeworski et al. 2000). 
While studying cross-sectional differences in social policy outcomes in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and East Asia, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) find evidence that the 
economic context affects the politics of welfare reform in all geographical areas. More 
specifically, economic growth creates more opportunities for ‘spenders’, or the political 
actors that argue for expansion of social commitments. Similarly, Brown and Hunter 
(1999) show that authoritarian and democratic regimes in Latin America tend to behave 
differently based on their economic performance. That is, authoritarian regimes with 
lower levels of GDP per capita also have lower levels of social spending compared to 
democratic regimes. Yet, as economic performance declines, the difference between 
democratic and autocratic regimes grows. Altogether, those studies demonstrate that a 
country’s economic performance has a positive effect on social spending.  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide some initial evidence regarding the relationship 
between economic performance and health and education expenditure in all authoritarian 
regimes from 1995 to 2014.  
 




Figure 3.1 GDP growth rate and level of health expenditure (as a percentage 
of GDP), average (1995–2014) 




Figure 3.2 GDP growth rate and level of education expenditure (as a 
percentage of GDP), average (1995–2014) 




Both figures suggest a negative relationship between the average GDP growth rate and 
the average level of public expenditure on education and health in each country. Based 
on this preliminary evidence, it seems that higher GDP growth rates are negatively related 
to levels of social spending in authoritarian contexts. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that 
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some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, Myanmar and the Central African 
Republic, report significantly low levels of education expenditure compared to other 
autocracies, while Lesotho and Yemen are among the biggest spenders in education6. 
Since the Ministry of Education of Lesotho established an inclusive education system in 
1991, public spending on education has risen exponentially (Mosia 2014). In Yemen, 
spending on education increased from 5.1 to 6.1% of the GDP from 1996 to 2000, and it 
reached 10% of the GDP in the first years of the 2000s (World Bank 2002; Yuki 2003). 
Despite impressive education spending, neither Lesotho nor Yemen have the best 
economic performance. On average, the GDP growth rate of Lesotho was about 3.8%, 
while Yemen’s GDP growth rate was 4.5%. Compared to Iraq (13.17%), Qatar (11.38%) 
and China (9.58%), these values are quite low. Additionally, Myanmar also features an 
inverse relationship between these two dimensions. 
GDP growth is a good indicator of a country’s economic performance, but growth 
does not affect all groups in the same way; the gains from economic growth may be 
distributed differently across different income groups. Hence, GDP per capita provides a 
better picture of the overall well-being of citizens, as it captures the extent to which 
economic performance translates to a population’s income. Additionally, countries differ 
greatly in terms of population size. The population of China, for instance, is eight times 
larger than the population of Cuba7. 
 Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot the levels of public education and health expenditure with 
the log of GDP per capita for the overall sample of autocracies. Despite the theoretical 
assumption of a positive relationship between economic growth and social spending, both 
figures suggest that social expenditure increases with GDP per capita until a certain point, 
when an inverse trend can be observed. Thus, both figures point to an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between social expenditure and economic performance and suggest that this 
relationship might be influenced by a country’s natural resource endowment and level of 
economic openness. In fact, the group of countries with the highest GDP per capita are 
either oil-producing economies, such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
 
 
6 Figure 3.1 and 3.2 does not include Cuba, for which there are no data on GDP growth, or Iraq, for which  
  there are no data on education expenditure. 




Figure 3.3 Changes in GDP per capita and level of health expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP, average (1995–2014) 





Figure 3.4 GDP per capita (log) and level of education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, average (1995–2014) 




and Kuwait, or opened economies, such as Singapore. These countries report lower levels 
of social spending compared to, for instance, Cuba, Yemen and Lesotho. Below, I will 




Overall, based on this preliminary empirical evidence, there are two considerations that 
can be inferred about the relationship between economic performance and social 
spending. First, countries with a higher GDP growth rate tend to have lower levels of 
public spending. Second, the tentative fitting lines show that, for more positive changes 
in GDP per capita, there is a higher level of public spending on both health and education 
until a certain point, when an inverse relationship is observed. This preliminary evidence 
suggests that the correlation between GDP per capita and social spending is not linear, 
and other factors, such as oil revenues and trade openness, may influence this relationship. 
This discussion led to the elaboration of the following hypotheses:  
 
 
H1.a:  There is a negative relationship between GDP growth and the level of public 
expenditure on health and education. 
 
 
H1.b: The relationship between GDP per capita and public health and education 
expenditure follows an inverse U-shaped curve, suggesting that the relationship 
is not linear. 
 
 
3.1.2. The Rentier Effect  
 
 
In light of the above discussion, natural resource abundance may influence the 
government’s decisions about the allocation of public expenditure and thus deserves 
closer attention. The rentier state theory can help to detect the effect of natural resources 
on economic growth and the stability of the regime (Auty 2001; M. Ross 2012; Sachs and 
Warner 1999; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015) as well as on policy decisions (M. L. 
Ross 2001) and outcomes (Daniele 2011). 
 The term ‘rentier state’ refers to those countries that receive substantial amounts of 
external rents on a regular basis (Mahdavy 1970). Rents, conceived as the surplus that is 
generated from the production of natural resources, such as oil, gas and minerals, allow 
policymakers to distribute revenues directly from their pockets. The rentier state literature 
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demonstrates that resource endowment directly impacts a country’s economic 
development but indirectly influences the regime’s stability and public expenditure. The 
direction of the effect of natural resource endowment on economic growth, however, 
remains controversial. One group of scholars argues that the production of natural 
resource is positively linked to a country’s economic development. That is, countries with 
higher levels of natural resource production grow faster than those who do not rely on 
natural resources (Brunnschweiler 2008; Mahdavy 1970). Other scholars, however, 
contend that economic development in resource-rich countries tends to diminish over the 
long term (Bulte, Damania, and Deacon 2005), and therefore, resource abundance is 
negatively associated with economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1999). A common thread 
among those contributions is that the effect of natural resources on economic growth 
depends on, among other factors, the type of indicator – production or exports of natural 
resources as a percentage of GDP – and the type of resources under investigation (Daniele 
2011; M. L. Ross 1999a; 2015).  
  Natural resources not only directly influence economic growth but also indirectly 
affect a regime’s stability and the allocation of public expenditure. Michael Ross (2001), 
for instance, demonstrates that there are three mechanisms through which oil wealth 
affects authoritarian regimes’ endurance and public spending. First, in oil-rich countries, 
leaders tend to adopt a low level of fiscal taxation because they rely on revenues 
stemming from the oil industry. Low taxation leads to less demand for political 
accountability, which in turn increases the stability of the regime (taxation effect). 
Second, oil wealth leads to greater spending on patronage and social spending because 
the distribution of benefits to some actors in oil-rich countries is less costly and dampens 
pressure for democratisation (spending effect). Third, oil revenues prevent the emergence 
of independent social groups that may hamper a regime’s stability (group formation 
effect). The overall logic of Ross’s argument is that oil revenues are often used by 
authoritarian leaders to relieve social pressures and prevent political demands that might 
undermine a government’s survival. According to the rentier state literature, we should 
expect resource-rich autocracies to have higher levels of public spending in the health 





Number Country Name Oil and Gas Income  (Per Capita) 
1 Qatar  31065 
2 Kuwait  21905 
3 United Arab Emirates 13204 
4 Oman 8576 
5 Saudi Arabia  8565 
6 Libya 5145  
7 Gabon  4375 
8 Bahrain  3851 
10 Turkmenistan  3099 
11 Venezuela 2786 
12 Russia 2277 
13 Kazakhstan 2110 
14 Azerbaijan 2057 
15 Algeria  1940 
16 Iraq 1888 
17 Angola 1790 
18 Congo 1689 
19 Iran 1586 
20 Malaysia 1030  
Table 1 Summary of the top 20 oil- and gas-producing authoritarian regimes, average (1995–2014)  
Source: Michael Ross and Paasha Mahdavi, QoG (2014) 
 
 
Table 1 reports the average production of oil and gas per capita in the top 20 authoritarian 
regimes between 1995 and 2014. I decided to focus on oil and gas production per capita 
for two reasons. First, scholars demonstrate that oil and gas are the two most influential 
resources affecting a regime’s economic performance and stability (M. L. Ross 1999a; 
Auty 2001). Second, as I have discussed above, the level of natural resource production 
per capita is a more representative indicator of a country’s natural resource wealth than 
the amount of exports since the latter considers only the revenues that stem from the 
export of those resource and does not take into account the amount of oil and gas that is 
consumed nationally. Thus, total production per capita concede us to control for the 
overall production of the country as well as the population. This allows countries such as 
 
 66 
Russia or China to be compared with countries such as Cuba or Bahrein, which differ 
greatly in terms of population. 
Overall, Table 1 shows that natural resources are not confined to a certain 
geographic area. The 15 biggest oil producers are located in the Middle East (Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain), North Africa (Algeria and 
Libya), Sub-Saharan Africa (Gabon), Latin America (Venezuela) and Central Asia 
(Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia). Yet, the variation among those 
countries is quite considerable. Qatar – the first in terms of oil and gas income per capita 
– produces more than four times the amount of natural resources produced by Oman – 
the fourth country in terms of oil and gas income per capita. This variation shows that 
few non-democratic regimes have oil- and gas-driven economies while the majority are 
poor in natural resources. 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate the relationship between the level of oil and gas 
production per capita (shown on the horizontal axis) and the average country-level health 
or education expenditure (shown on the vertical axis)8. As expected, both figures show 
that the majority of countries have very low levels of oil and gas income, and only few 
countries – Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar – have a 
large amount of natural resources. Those figures lead us to argue that the total oil and gas 
wealth does not affect social spending, and therefore, the rentier argument does not apply 
when analysing variation in the level of public spending on the health and education 
sectors across authoritarian regimes. Yet, there are some theoretical and empirical 
considerations that need to be addressed.  
First, the distribution of oil and gas production is positively skewed; only few 
countries have high levels of oil or gas income per capita, and the majority of them do 
not change. This translates to very low variation in the level of oil and gas production. 
Second, some scholars show that oil wealth has different effects on autocratic endurance 
and regime stability, and we should distinguish between short-term (change in oil wealth) 
and long-term (level of oil wealth) effects (M. Ross 2015). In light of these 
considerations, it is reasonable to assume that it is not the level of oil and gas production 
that affects public spending, but changes in oil and gas production.  
 




Figure 3.5 Level of oil and gas income per capita and public health expenditure, 
average (1995–2014) 




Figure 3.6 Level of oil and gas income per capita and public education 
expenditure, average (1995–2014) 





Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the previous relationship based on changes in oil and gas wealth 
per capita rather than the level of wealth. As we can see, both figures show that there is 
almost no effect of changes in oil and gas production on the levels of health and education 




Figure 3.7 Changes in oil and gas production per capita and level of health 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, average (1995–2014) 




Figure 3.8 Changes in oil and gas production per capita and level of education 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, average (1995–2014) 
Source: QoG (2018) 
 
 
and health expenditure, suggesting that positive changes in oil and gas production are 
associated with positive health expenditure. Though, this trend is almost nullified. This 
may support my previous evidence that the relationship between GDP per capita and 
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health expenditure is influenced by natural resource abundance. Figure 3.8 suggests that 
there is no rentier effect on education expenditure, and therefore the level of education 
expenditure does not depend on changes in oil and gas production. 
Overall, while the rentier state theory argues that resource-rich economies have 
higher levels of public spending, both Figures 3.7 and 3.8 suggest that changes in natural 
resource production do not influence public spending on the health and education sectors 
in authoritarian regimes. Following this evidence, I developed a second hypothesis: 
 
 
H2:  Oil and gas resources have no effect on health and education expenditure in 
authoritarian regimes, and changes in the production of natural resources do not 




3.1.3. Globalisation: opportunity to expand or retrench?  
 
 
The previous two hypotheses highlight the importance of the domestic structure of the 
economy. Yet, the allocation of public spending in a country’s budget depends not only 
on its internal economic structure but also external factors. Both preliminary evidence in 
the previous sections and common wisdom demonstrate that global capital mobility and 
international market pressures shape policy decisions (Rudra and Haggard 2005; Swank 
1998; 2002; Wibbels 2006). 
As noted in the previous chapter, there are two schools of thought regarding the 
effect of globalisation on government size. The ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis suggests 
that economic globalisation limits the expansion of welfare states and produces a 
convergence around minimalist welfare structures (Swank 2002). This logic implies a 
competition for the lowest distribution of social benefits. Conversely, the ‘race to the top’ 
argument posits that economic openness and international capital mobility increase the 
demand for public sector intervention and that governments use social policies to 
compensate their citizens for the emergence of new, externally induced economic and 
social risks. Although there is no agreement on the direction the effect of globalisation 




Figure 3.9 Trade openness and level of health expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, average (1995–2014) 




Figure 3.10 Trade openness and level of education expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP, average (1995–2014) 




believe that globalisation may influence the relationship between economic growth and 
social spending. Additionally, scholars also demonstrate that economic openness is an 
important factor that should be taken into account while studying policy decisions 
(Mosley 2005; Rodrik 1998). 
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Figures 3.9 and 3.10 plot changes in the level of public spending for health and education 
on the vertical axis and log levels of trade openness on the horizontal axis. Similar to the 
oil and gas income per capita, I use the change of trade openness to illustrate this 
relationship as the majority of dictatorships are economically closed. Both figures suggest 
that there is a positive relationship between economic openness and social spending. That 
is, countries with higher levels of trade openness are correlated with higher levels of 
social spending9. This preliminary evidence supports the compensation argument and 




H3:  There is a positive relationship between public expenditure in health and 
education and economic openness in authoritarian regimes. Thus, positive 






3.2. Political Determinants  
 
 
So far, I have discussed whether globalisation and economic performance have direct and 
indirect effects on public health and education expenditure in authoritarian regimes. Yet, 
some scholars contend that an increase in the amount of resources at the government’s 
disposal due to better economic performance does not necessarily translate into more 
public spending since political factors mediate the effect of economic performance on 
policy decisions (Esping-Andersen 1990; Myles and Quadagno 2002). 
Hence, in this second part of the chapter, I elaborate on three sets of hypothesis that 
pinpoint the political determinants of social expenditure. First, I take into account the 
level of institutionalisation across non-democratic regimes. As shown in the introduction, 
non-democratic regimes differ greatly in terms of the presence of elections and the extent 
 
9 The case of Singapore is an outlier and may mislead the interpretation of the relationship between health 
and education spending with trade openness. As it can be seen, Singapore has the most opened economy 
among all the authoritarian regimes, yet it does not display significantly high levels of social spending 
compared to other autocracies. 
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of party competition within the country. A recent strand in the literature on authoritarian 
regimes highlights the role of institutions in shaping policy decisions (Gandhi 2003; 
2008b; 2008a; Pepinsky 2014). Based on similar assumptions, I hypothesise that different 
levels of institutionalisation influence decisions on social spending. A second political 
variable of interest is governments’ political ideology. As many studies in the welfare 
state literature demonstrates, political ideology is crucial for understanding the variation 
in social spending across countries (Cameron 1978; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; 
van Kersberg 1995; Korpi 1985; Stephens 1979; Wilensky 2002). Based on these 
contributions and initial evidence, I hypothesise that those factors influence policy 
decisions in authoritarian contexts. Finally, while the first two political variables capture 
the supply side of state intervention into social sectors, the last hypothesis sheds light on 
the demand side of state intervention and, more specifically, on the strength of the 
opposition groups. 
Similar to the previous section, this part of the chapter is organised in a cumulative 
way. First, I briefly present the contributions from the literature, discuss their applicability 
to authoritarian contexts and then present preliminary evidence that leads to the 
formulation of the hypotheses. 
 
 




Autocrats do not govern in isolation and only with repressive tools. As for democratic 
regimes, leaders in authoritarian regimes need political support to secure their position in 
power (Geddes 1999). To acquire political support, autocrats can use either military 
power and repression, which is usually costly and not always effective (Wintrobe 1998), 
or provide policy concessions to their citizens (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Policy 
concessions, however, require a place where citizens’ preferences are revealed. By 
establishing institutions such as elections and legislatures, autocratic leaders allow 
opposition groups to enter the political arena, and they create a locus where autocrats gain 
information about citizens’ preferences (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Thus, according 
to Gandhi (2008b), more institutionalised regimes should provide more policy 
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concessions. Following this logic, in her work, Gandhi (2008b) tests whether elections 
and legislatures influence patterns of social spending across all authoritarian regimes 
from 1972 to 2002. However, she finds no statistical evidence on the effect of elections 
on public social spending. As the author herself argues, no empirical evidence is due to 
the lack of data on social expenditures, which reduces the sample size to about 17% as 
well as the use of an aggregate dependent variable that does not disentangle the dynamics 
of public spending for each of the sectors (i.e. education, health and pension). Despite the 
lack of evidence, other scholars demonstrate that autocrats are not immune to institutions 
when it comes to social policy decisions. Cassani and Carbone (2015), for instance, 
demonstrate that more competitive autocracies – defined as authoritarian regimes where 
there are limited forms of political participation – in Africa tend to outperform less 
competitive regimes in terms of welfare development and social spending. Another study 
worth of notice is the book of Bueno de Mesquita (2003), in which he demonstrates that 
institutions for selecting leaders and the distribution of power among various actors 
influence leaders’ incentive to promote different types of policy. Regarding social 
expenditure, he argues that the size of the winning coalition affects the leader’s decision 
to spend on public versus private sectors. That is, regimes with a large coalition size 
commit more resources to education and health than small-coalition governments. 
Following a similar logic, in his recently published book, Eibl (2020) posits that social 
spending in authoritarian regimes is affected by the size of the coalition in power. That 
is, regimes that rely on the support of broader coalitions tend to shield their population 
from social spending cuts. He also demonstrates that this behaviour is more accentuated 
in authoritarian regimes where networks of patronage and distribution are more 
institutionalised. 
In line with these contributions, I expect that both formal and informal institutions 
would affect the decisions regarding public expenditure in authoritarian regimes. On one 
hand, formal institutions allow different groups to participate to the decision-making 
process and provide a channel for citizens to voice their demands for more social benefits, 
while the size of the winning coalition determines the leader’s incentive to distribute 
public goods to members outside of the ruling coalition. Overall, then, there are two 
aspects that should be taken into account: the level of institutionalisation and the size of 
the winning coalition. 
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 Level of Institutionalisation 
Type and Size of 
Winning Coalition 
Electoral Competition Party Competition 
Family 


















Table 2 Typology of authoritarian regimes 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates a typology for authoritarian regimes according to (1) the type and size 
of the winning coalition, (2) the presence of elections and (3) the extent of party 
competition. Importantly, the theoretical underpinning of this classification is based on a 
three-step cumulative logic. 
The first distinctive dimension takes into account the role of informal institutions, 
such as the type and size of the ruling coalition that supports the leader. Monarchs 
substantially rely on the support of family members and kin networks, which are very 
small in terms of size. Contemporary monarchies are particularly common in the Middle 
East and North Africa, where rulers bear the title of king or emir, such as in Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain and Morocco. In military regimes, the leader is 
selected from the armed forces and he rules with the support of officials or members of 
the military council. Hence, the winning coalition from which he needs support is bigger 
than in monarchies. Today, those regimes are less common than monarchies, and most of 
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them are located in Africa, such as the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic. Importantly, there is no 
relationship between military regime type and military spending (Please refer to Figure 
A. 10 in the Appendix). Finally, civilian dictatorships are characterised by a larger 
winning coalition compared to both monarchies and military regimes. Here, the leader 
does not have a ready-made organisation on which he can rely, but he creates his own 
type of organisation, such as a political party, once in power. Today, civilian dictatorships 
are the most common type of autocracy in the world. 
The second constitutive element of this typology is the presence of elections, which 
makes it possible to distinguish between traditional and electoral autocracies. This 
distinction is not new, and it is has been widely used in the research on authoritarian 
regimes (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Schedler 2006). However, previous studies 
distinguish autocracies between closed and electoral regimes by combining elections and 
legislatures with party competition (Gandhi 2008b). The typology presented here 
distinguishes between traditional monarchy, military and civilian dictatorships and 
electoral ones, in which political power is transferred through elections. While traditional 
autocracies include regimes that differ in the type and size of the winning coalition, none 
have elections. Autocracies with elections include those in which there are de jure 
elections for the chief executive or for members of the legislature. Importantly, elections 
are not free and fair, as in the case of democracies, but they constitute a channel through 
which political power is legitimately transferred across members of the winning coalition. 
Traditional civilian dictatorships are extremely rare nowadays. This type of regime is a 
party-based autocracy that is ruled by one political party but does not have elections, such 
as the case of German Nazi Party from 1933 to 1945 and the Italian National Fascist Party 
from 1922 to 1943. Today, however, even North Korea, one of the most closed and 
repressive dictatorships in the world10, holds elections for its national legislature every 
four years. 
The last constitutive element of this typology is the level of party competition. 
Electoral monarchies and military or civilian regimes differ in the extent to which the 
leader or the winning coalition allows internal political competition. In the case of no-
 
10 According to the Economist Intelligent Unit Report (2018) and Freedom House Report State 
of Democracy (2018). 
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party regimes, there are no political parties that are allowed to compete, and competition 
is allowed only among individual candidates. Importantly, this category is only valid for 
monarchies11 and military regimes12 because the distinctive characteristic of civilian 
dictatorships is the presence of a political organisation (i.e. political party) from which 
the leader is supported, and thus no-party civilian dictatorships do not exist theoretically. 
In a one-party regimes, all parties but one are forbidden (formally or de facto) from taking 
part in elections. A small number of non-party candidates may be allowed to take part 
and be elected, or there may be satellite parties that are autonomous in name but cannot 
take an independent position. As a consequence, there is a single party that dominates 
political competition in those regimes. The last type of electoral regime is limited 
multiparty. This type of regime has parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at 
least some) candidates are able to participate formally independently of the ruling regime. 
Yet, elections are rigged, and leaders may allow competition between no more than two 
parties, as in the case of Malaysia. 
Overall, this typology builds on the work of Gandhi (2008b), Hadenius and Teorell 
(2007) and Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius (2013), though it is innovative in two ways. 
First, this approach is based on three elements that capture both formal and informal 
institutions. So far, previous classifications have focused on either the type of winning 
coalition and different segments of society from which autocrats need support (Geddes 
1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014) or on the type of institutions used to identify the 
head of the government (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Gandhi 2008a). A third, 
more recent classification elaborated by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Wahman, 
Teorell, and Hadenius (2013) is closer to the type of classification I develop here, though 
it focuses on different modes of political power maintenance, and it does not take into 
account the type and size of the winning coalition. Second, this typology allows one to 
capture the extensive variation that exists across non-democratic regimes and that is not 
limited in space or time. As discussed in the introduction, before the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991a), the number of electoral regimes was quite limited, 
and more non-electoral regimes were more common. This typology has the advantage of  
 
 
11 This is the case for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Swaziland. 
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Table 3 Typology of authoritarian regimes according to the level of institutionalisation and 




breaking down the distinction between closed and electoral autocracies and 
contemporaneously sheds light on the role of informal institutions (i.e. type and size of 
the winning coalition) in shaping policy decisions. 
Having said so, it is possible to identify six different regime types according to the 
size of the winning coalition and the level of institutionalisation. Table 3 illustrates those 
representative cases. On the horizontal axis, there are different levels of 
institutionalisation (low, medium, high) while on the vertical axis, there are different sizes 
of the winning coalition (small, medium, big). The regime type with highest levels of 
institutionalisation and biggest coalition size is limited-multiparty civilian dictatorship, 
while traditional monarchy has the lowest levels of institutionalisation and the smallest 
group size. Military regimes have a bigger coalition size than monarchies, but smaller 
than civil dictatorships. Military juntas or councils are bigger than family networks but 
relatively smaller than parties. Moving along the horizontal axis, we have traditional, one-
party and limited-multiparty regimes. Importantly, it should bear in mind that (1) no-party 
civilians do not exist in practice and (2) no-party monarchies and military regimes are a 
residual category of traditional autocracies. 
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Overall, I assume that differences in the size of the winning coalition and the level of 
institutionalisation would influence social spending. First, the size of the winning 
coalition creates different incentives for the leaders to provide policy concessions. A 
bigger winning coalition means that a large amount of people must be assuaged by the 
leader, and therefore, in governments with bigger winning coalitions, the leader would 
distribute more social benefits than when the winning coalition is smaller. Second, 
institutions provide opportunities for opposition groups to enter the political arena and 
consequently influence policy decisions. Hence, I assume that institutions would foster 
political participation and thus more institutionalised regimes would distribute more 
social benefits than less institutionalised regimes. This translates to different levels of 
public social spending across no-party, one-party and limited-multiparty regimes. 
Following this line of reasoning, Figure 3.11 illustrates the average public spending 
in health and education for different sizes of the winning coalition. As discussed above, 
monarchies have the smallest ruling coalitions, while civilian dictatorships have the 
largest ones. As can be seen, the figure shows that monarchies tends to outspend military 
regimes in terms of both health and education, while civilian dictatorships have almost 
the same levels of health spending compared to monarchies. This preliminary evidence 
hints at the assumption that military regimes are the worst performers in terms of social 
spending, while monarchies and civilian autocracies tend to spend more in social sectors. 
Figure 3.12 shows the level of institutionalisation that can be captured in four types 
of regimes: traditional, no-party, one-party and limited-multiparty regimes. As we can 
see, no-party and one-party regimes tend to outperform traditional regimes in terms of 
health and education expenditure. Interestingly, limited-multiparty regimes have lower 
levels of social spending compared to one-party and no-party regimes but higher levels 
compared to traditional regime types. This hints at the assumption that higher levels of 
institutionalisation reflect higher levels of social spending in authoritarian regimes. 
Overall, there are two important assumptions that can be made. First, when 
accounting for the size of the winning coalition, military regimes report lower levels of 
public spending compared to all other types of autocracies, suggesting that those regimes 






Figure 3.11 Health and education expenditure across different regime types 
(size of the winning coalition), average (1995–2014) 




Figure 3.12 Health and education expenditure across different regime types 
(level of institutionalisation), average (1995–2014) 





spending). Second, the level of institutionalisation affects the level of social spending as 
more institutionalized regimes – no-party, one-party and limited-multiparty regimes – 
spend more than traditional autocracies. Yet, when it comes to party competition, one-
party regimes spend much more than all other types of electoral regimes, such as no-party 




H4.a:  Military regimes spend less than monarchies and civilian dictatorships. 
 
H4.b:  Authoritarian regimes with higher levels of institutionalisation have higher levels 
of public expenditure on health and education compared to traditional regime type.  
 





3.2.2. The Role of Political Ideology  
 
 
Although most authoritarian regimes fit in one of the categories identified above, the need 
for political support and the subsequent decision on the level of social spending may be  
influenced by other political factors, such as the ideology used by the leader to legitimise 
his position in power. As we saw in the previous chapter, the literature on comparative 
social policy demonstrates that political ideology plays a pivotal role in shaping patterns 
of social spending in both developed and developing countries.   
Those scholars argue that the distribution of power between left parties and labour 
organisations on one hand and central–right-wing parties and business groups on the other 
determine differences in the size and distribution of welfare states across countries 
(Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Korpi 1985; Stephens 1979; Huber and Stephens 




Figure 3.13 Political ideology and public health and education expenditure as 
percentage of GDP, average (1995–2014) 




factor when analysing policy decisions across non-democratic countries. The Cuban 
regime of Fidel Castro, for instance, is very different from regimes located in the Middle 
East and North African region, where leaders legitimise their positions and power using 
different political ideologies based on religious beliefs and economic performance 
(Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; Gerschewski 2013). Following this line of reasoning, 
I should expect autocracies with a left-wing ideology to adopt different types of policies 
compared to right-wing autocracies.  
Figure 3.13 shows the amount of public spending on health and education in 
regimes with different types of ideologies. Here, ideology is defined according to the 
largest governmental party’s orientation13, which is divided into three groups: right-wing, 
left-wing and central orientations. This figure shows differences in the health and 
education sectors across different orientations. Right-wing governments tend to spend 
more on health compared to other regimes, while left-wing governments spend much 
more on education. Interestingly, regimes with central ideology also have relatively high 
 
13 See Dahlberg et al. (2018). 
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levels of public spending on education compared to central and right-wing regimes. 
Overall, the assumptions of the power-resource theory seem to not be entirely supported. 
Based on this evidence, the fifth hypothesis was developed: 
 
 
H5:  Right-wing autocracies spend more on health than central and left-wing 
autocracies. Left-wing autocracies spend more on education compared to central 





3.2.3. The Strength of Opposition Groups  
 
 
So far, I have focused on the supply side of public spending and the determinants that 
drive autocrats’ policy decisions, such as formal and informal institutions and political 
ideologies. In the last section of this chapter, I want to shed light on the demand side of 
public spending and, more specifically, on the role of opposition groups, defined as all 
groups that are outside of the government, in the autocratic policy-making process.  
For many years, scholars contributing to the literature on authoritarian regimes have 
contended that political power in those regimes is strongly centralised in the hands of a 
leader, which consequently constrains opposition groups’ access to the policy process 
(Fearon 1994; Lake 1992). Autocrats often suppress other groups’ voices in order to 
eliminate dissent and reduce the probability of being overthrown. Based on this 
assumption, some scholars argue that opposition and interest groups in non-democratic 
regimes have only a marginal role in the policy process because they are not independent 
(Hrebenar, McBeth, and Morgan 2008) and are mostly co-opted by the ruler (Albrecht 
2005; Hasmath and Hsu 2016). 
Yet, other scholars demonstrate there are some groups that manage to gain access 
and influence the policy process despite the closed and hierarchical political context of 
authoritarian regimes. For instance, Steinberg and Shih (2012) provide evidence that 
interest groups in China strategically influenced policy decisions in the tradable industry 
to keep the exchange rate undervalued between 2003 and 2006. Similarly, Teets (2017) 
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demonstrates that strong policy networks in China successfully influence elites’ 
conception of policy problems and the range of policy solutions. Those single-case 
studies demonstrate that autocracies are not immune to groups’ pressure and that stronger 
groups may influence policy decisions. However, to what extent can the strength of 
opposition groups affect social spending decisions? 
In previous chapters I have assumed that autocrats use public spending as a way to 
secure their position in power. Stronger opposition groups, however, may challenge the 
stability of the regime. Though, the success of a rebellion depends on the organisation of 
the opposition as well as on the ability of the autocrat to repress dissent (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007). The stronger the opposition, the higher the probability of overthrowing 
the leader. As a consequence, autocrats who face stronger opposition groups have more 
incentives to distribute public goods than those in which opposition groups are weaker. 
In empirical terms, however, it is very difficult to measure the actual strength of 
opposition groups in authoritarian regimes, as data on those groups are extremely difficult 
to collect. Hence, I use the number of years of democratic experience as a proxy for the 
strength of opposition groups. Regimes that have undergone a period of democratisation 
face a higher threat to autocratic stability, as some segments of society are already 
organised and capable of using pre-existing structures. Under these circumstances, 
banning existing parties is a more difficult task than simply not allowing new parties to 
form. As a result, rulers who inherit a democratic legacy may be unable to prevent 
opposition even when it is weak. 
Figure 3.14 illustrates patterns of public expenditure on health and education based 
on the number of years that a country was classified as democratic according to Wahman, 
Teorell and Hadenius’s (2013) classification. The histogram shows that while health 
expenditure seems to be unaffected by the years of democratic experience, education 
spending decreases for countries with two to seven years of democracy but  subsequently 
increases. Overall, it seems that the years of democratic experience do not reflect a clear 
pattern on health and education spending in authoritarian regimes. Following this 





Figure 3.14 Years of democratic experience and public health and 
education expenditure as a percentage of GDP, average (1995–2014) 





H6:  The strength of opposition groups does not affect government decisions on public 
expenditure in authoritarian regimes. In particular, regimes that have undergone a 
period of democratisation do not differ from long-lived autocratic regimes in terms 




3.3. Concluding remarks  
 
 
In this chapter, I elaborate on a new, inclusive approach for studying patterns of social 
expenditure in authoritarian regimes. To this end, I argue that economic performance 
determines the pool of resources from which autocrats can tap into but it does not always 
translate into policy decisions. Instead, economic structure, coalition size and the level of 
institutionalisation affect the need for autocrats to distribute resources. The assumption 
underlying the theoretical framework is that autocrats do not live in isolation; like 
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democratic leaders, they need to acquire political support from either members of the 
ruling coalition or actors outside of the political arena. They use public expenditure in 
social sectors such as health and education as an instrument to acquire political support 
and secure their position and power. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I hypothesise that economic 
conditions determine the pool of goods that autocrats can tap into and distribute to their 
citizens. Surprisingly, preliminary evidence suggests that economic performance, 
expressed in terms of GDP growth, is negatively associated with public expenditure in 
health and education, while GDP per capita predicts positive patterns of public spending 
in both sectors. Yet, the preliminary evidence also shows that there might be other factors, 
such natural resources and economic openness, that influence this relationship. In light of 
the rentier state theory, I hypothesise that changes in oil and gas production do not have  
any effects on the levels of health and education expenditure. Finally, while discussing 
the effect of globalisation on social spending, I argue that countries that open up their 
economies tend to compensate their citizens for the loss of competitiveness by 
distributing more public goods. 
In the second part of the chapter, I take into account both political and institutional 
factors that may affect policy decisions. More specifically, I look at the level of 
institutionalisation based on the presence of elections and the extent of party competition 
and the type and size of the winning coalition. After elaborating on a typology for 
authoritarian regimes, I hypothesise that more institutionalised regimes tend to distribute 
more than less institutionalised ones. Regarding the role of political ideology, I assume 
that left-wing governments tend to spend more on education than other autocracies, while 
right-wing autocracies spend more on the health sector. Finally, I consider the strength of 
opposition groups and their role in influencing policy decisions. To account for this factor 
and due to the lack of other potential indicators, I use the number of years of democratic 
experience as proxy for opposition strength. Theoretical reasoning would assume that 
periods of democracy enhance the strength of opposition groups, as the cost for the leader 
to remove such groups is higher than in regimes that never experience democracy. 
However, based on the preliminary evidence, I hypothesise the strength of opposition 
groups does not influence public spending in either the healthcare or education sector.  
 
 86 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay down theoretical foundations that guide the empirical 
analysis presented in the next chapter. To do so, I build on previous research on social 
policy in developing countries and combine it with initial evidence of the dynamics of 
social spending in authoritarian regimes to develop an inclusive and comprehensive 






























Chapter Four   
 
Determinants of Health and Education Spending 
in Authoritarian Regimes: A Time-Series-Cross-







Political scientists have enjoyed increasing success in extracting information from 
 numerical data. Thanks to the work of political methodologists in the last decade or 
two, we have imported and adapted statistical approaches 
from other disciplines, created new models from scratch, and  
applied these models in every empirical subfield  










This chapter presents the empirical analysis for the determinants of public spending in 
health and education across authoritarian regimes. The chapter is divided in six sections. 
The first one presents the data and more specifically, how the dataset has been created. 
The second section discusses dependent, independent and control variables that are 
includes in the empirical analysis and displays the descriptive statistics for the variables 
of interest. In the third section, I present the analytical technique and discuss model 
specifications used to assess the hypothesized effect of the covariates on the dependent 
variables. In this section I also discuss the missing values problem for education 
expenditure and a method that deals with missingness in time-series-cross-sectional 
(TSCS) data. Finally, the last section discusses the results of the analysis. The chapter 
ends with a summary of the empirical evidence drawn from the models and a discussion 





One of the reasons why social policy analysis in authoritarian regimes is still sketchy is 
linked to the difficulties in collecting data and the lack of a recent fine-grained dataset on 
social policy in those regimes (Forrat 2005). Over the years however, many scholars have 
successfully attempted to collect those data and creates more extensive datasets. Among 
others, Przeworski et al. (2000) developed a dataset that includes data on health spending 
for 141countries between 1950 and 1990. Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita (2003) created a 
global sample on health and education spending in all countries from 1960 to 1999. More 
recently, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) and  Segura-Ubiergo (2001) developed a dataset 
for both democratic and authoritarian regimes in Latin America and East Asia. A more 
recent and inclusive dataset for authoritarian regimes was developed by Jennifer Gandhi 
in 2008. She used the Government Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund 
(IGFS) to collect data on central government expenditures in autocracies from 1946 to 
2002.  Although this dataset is very informative, the data for public education, health and 
social security are marginal. The sample size for those indicators in fact, includes less 
than 700 country-years observations. More recently, Eibl (2020) and Richter and Viola 
(2010) developed the Global State Revenues and Expenditures (GSRE) dataset which 
includes data on state budget for 150 countries between 1946 to 2006.  Yet, when it comes 
to expenditure in health, education and social protection the overall sample size shrinks 
to less than 500 country-year observations for authoritarian regimes.  
 To overcome the lack of data, I have spent the last three years to collect data and 
develop a new and more recent dataset that includes 1860 observations (N x T) for public 
expenditure in health and education for ninety-three authoritarian regimes (N)  between 
1995 and 2014 (T). This period has been selected for two reasons. First, with the advent 
of the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991a), we witness an increasing 
number of countries shifting from dictatorships to democracy. In the same time, the third 
wave of democratization brought about the emerge of a new type of authoritarian regime: 
electoral accuracies (Schedler 2006) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 
2002, 2010). Starting from 1990s, many autocrats in fact, began to establish nominally 
democratic institutions such as elections and legislatures. Therefore, this period allows to 
control for variation in the institutional settings across authoritarian regimes. The second 
reason is that it is the longest time-span and the most recent period for which data are 
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available. Data on public health expenditure for non-democratic regimes are missing 
before 1995 while data on public education expenditures are more limited after 2014 
(Dahlberg et al. 2018) .  
For what concerns the unit of analysis, the dataset includes ninety-three countries 
that have been classified as non-democratic regimes according to Hadenius and Teorell 
(2007) regime type classification. There is a twofold explanation for this decision. First, 
it is a theoretical choice. The literature on authoritarianism provides many typologies of 
authoritarian regimes (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Gandhi 2008b; Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz 2014). Yet, in their classification, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) 
theorizes autocracy and democracy as two faces of the same coin. That is, they employ a 
quantitative threshold based on a continuous measure from democracy to autocracy. I 
believe that by looking at democracy and autocracy not as two distinctive categories but 
as two ends of the same continuum, I would able to better analyse within-regime 
variations. The second reason is methodological. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) 
classification combines both formal and informal institutions. Their classification builds 
up on different modes for autocrats to maintaining political power and shed lights on the 
institutional settings across non-democratic regimes. One of the hypotheses that I have 
elaborated in the previous chapter assumes that the level of institutionalization 
conceptualized according to the presence of electoral institutions and party competition 
influences social spending (H4). Therefore, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) typology 
provides better indicators to capture the hypothesized effect.  
  The countries in the sample are located in five different geographical areas: Eastern 
Europe and post-Soviet Union, Latin America, Middle-East and North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa and East Asia and the Pacific (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). The data 
matrix includes only countries that have been authoritarian for more than three 
consecutive years because (1) countries that have been autocratic for a shorter period are 
commonly classified as semi-democracy rather than fully authoritarian regimes (Knutsen 
and Nygård 2015) and (2) those countries have a democratic legacy which could affect 
the analysis of the determinants of social spending in non-democratic contexts.   
 Finally, the dataset excludes countries with a  population lower than 1milion as 
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Economic Factors      
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GDP per capita in constant 2010  









Sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. 
1785 
 +/+ 
Political Factors       
Size of the winning 
coalition 
Monarchy, Military, 





Traditional, No-party One-party 
regime, Limited-Multiparty  1855 +/+ 
Ideology  Largest Party  Government Orientation  1659 +/+
d 
Democratic experience Years for which a country has been democratic  
 
1860 = / = 
Control Variables      
Repressive 
Authoritarianism   Military Expenditure as % of GDP 1620 – / – 
Population size 
- Under 14 
- Above 64 
% of population 14 and younger  






Fractionalization   Index of ethnic Fractionalization 1837 – / – 
Table 4 Description of the Variables and Hypothesized Effects 
Source: Quality of Government (2018)  
Note: a The first sign refers to hypothesized effect on health spending while the second sign refers to the 
hypothesized effect on education spending; b It refers to the panel sample size before multiple imputation; 
c   The ‘equal’ sign refers to no effect on either health or education expenditure  d The hypothesized effect is 
that right-wing spend more in health while left-wing more in education;  
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of the coefficients14. From a theoretical point of view, it is also misguided comparing 




4.2 Description of the Variables  
 
Table 4 summarizes the measures for dependent and independent variables as well as the 
hypothesized effects of each of the covariates. The first group of variables shown in the 
table includes the dependent variables – public expenditure in health and education  as a 
percentage of GDP – while the second group refers to the economic factors such as GDP 
growth, GDP per capita, oil and gas income per capita and trade openness. The third 
group instead, includes indicators accounting for the political dimension. More 
specifically, it refers to the size of the winning coalition and the level of 
institutionalization according to the presence of elections and the extent of party 
competition, the political ideology of the regime and democratic experience. In the 
following paragraphs I will also shed light on the importance of control variables that 




Measures for the dependent variables are the total level of public expenditure in health 
and education as a percentage of GDP. Data for both variables come from the Worldwide 
Governance indicators dataset (2017)16.  Public health expenditure includes of all current 
and capital spending from both central and local government budgets. It also includes 
external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds  
 
14  For this reasons I exclude countries such as  Antigua and Barbuda, Bhutan, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti,  
Equatorial Guinea, Fiji,  Maldives, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga. In addition, Taiwan  is 
also excluded as there are not data on the population size.  
15  See UN Database (2018) https://www.un.org/en/databases/ 




Figure 4.1 Distribution of public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(1995- 2014) 
     Source: Quality of Government Dataset (QoG) 2018  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Figure 1 Distribution of public education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP (1995-2014) 




(Dahlberg et al. 2018). Unfortunately, no data is available for regional-level spending.  
Public education expenditure instead, includes current and capital spending from the 
general government budget. General government refers to central, regional and local 
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governments (Dahlberg et al. 2018). Additionally, it includes expenditures that are funded 
by transfers from international sources and used by the government to finance educational 
services.  
The choice of those two indicators has a twofold motivation. The first motivation 
is entirely theoretical. The research question that animates this dissertation is ‘what are 
the determinants of social spending in authoritarian regimes?’. Thus, I adopt an inductive 
research strategy based on empirical observations about different trends in social 
spending across authoritarian regimes to build up a new approach which would explain 
these patterns. Second, although some scholars criticize public expenditure to be 
“epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states... as it is difficult to imagine 
anyone struggling for spending per se” (Esping-Andersen 1990), this is not the case in 
authoritarian regimes. By allocating social benefits to some sectors, dictator enhance the 
support of those groups that benefit from the resource allocation. For instance, different 
levels of spending in education show different needs for the autocrats to acquire support 
from young population. Therefore, social spending is a good indicator to how autocrats 
allocate their resources. Moreover, there is a very long tradition of studies in the 
comparative social policy research that investigates the determinants of social spending 
in developing economies and which argue that social spending gives a good picture of 
the dynamics of policy decisions in those contexts (Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 2017).  
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the distributions of both public health and education 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP over country-years observations. As we can see, both 
distributions are positively skewed suggesting that we have only few observations of high 
levels of public expenditure in both health and education. Values for health spending 
range between 0 and 11.5 percent of GDP. Countries with the lowest levels of health 
expenditures are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Indonesia  and Pakistan 
whereas countries with the highest levels of health expenditures are Cuba, Lesotho, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Jordan and Croatia. In the case of education spending instead, the 
top-five are Cuba, Lesotho, Tunisia, Ukraine and Swaziland while the lowest-five 






Independent Variables  
 
The second and third groups account for both economic and political factors that shape 
policy decisions in social sectors. Among others, GDP growth rate (%) and GDP per 
capita relate to the economic performance of the countries. GDP growth rate refers to the 
year-on-year changes in the overall amount of goods and services produced in a country 
to the same country. GDP per capita instead, refers to gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. Data for the GDP per capita are express in constant 2010 US dollars 
as it allows to compare levels of GDP per capita across countries. Both of them are 
continuous variables. Data on GDP growth are taken from the World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) database (2017) while data for GDP per capita come from the World Bank dataset 
(2017). Among other economic factors, the rentier effect is computed by adding overall 
levels of oil and gas production in a country. Data on oil and gas production are collected 
from Michael Ross and Mahdavi Oil and Gas dataset (2015)17. Finally, trade openness is 
operationalized as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP. Data for this indicator are retrieved from the World Bank dataset (2017). 
Both trade and rentier variables are continuous variables. 
Based on the theoretical expectations elaborated in the previous chapter, I expect 
that political factors such as the size of the winning coalition, the presence of elections, 
the extent of  party-competition, political ideology and opposition strength would also 
account for patterns of social spending. The first group of political factors refer to the size 
of the winning coalition which I operationalized according to Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland (2010) typology. They authors in fact, classify autocracies in military, civilian 
and royal. The dataset though ends in 2008 and thus, I collect information about political 
and institutional changes in those regimes to continue their classification until 2014. The 
necessary information about those regimes are collected from the V-Dem (2019) dataset 
and cross-check with data on political regime from the QoG dataset (2018). The second 
cluster of political factors are operationalised using different types of authoritarian 
regimes. To this end, I recode Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Wahman, Teorell, and 
Hadenius (2013) typologies in four autocratic regime type according to which I expect  
 
17  Please, find here the link to the dataset    
    https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y 
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different levels of institutionalization. Ideology is defined as the party’s government 
orientation along the left-right dimension with respect to economic policy. However, in 
the case of traditional monarchy and traditional military, ideology accounts for the 
political orientation of the group in charge. This variable is a categorical variable equals 
1 if largest government parties are either conservative or Christian democratic or right-
wing, 2 if largest government parties defined as liberal and centrist (i.e. those government 
parties that advocate for strengthening private enterprises and liberal reforms) 3 if largest 
government parties are communist, socialist or social-democratic and  0 for all those cases 
that do not fit in the previous categories as the party orientation is not on economic issues 
but on other topics (i.e. religion). Data for political ideology are collected from the Inter-
American Development Bank’s database of political institutions (DPI) (2015)18.  Finally, 
I use a proxy for the strength of opposition groups that reflects the sum of years for which 
a country has remained democratic. This variable is a discrete variable that ranges 
between 0 and 17.  
Overall, the total number of the observations for all independent variables is 
sufficiently high not to worry about panel sample size and potential problems in the 
estimation of the paraments. Yet, ideology reports slightly lower number of observations. 
Data for political ideology on authoritarian regimes are very difficult to collect. In order 
to increase the sample size I attempted to merge data on political ideology from other 
sources such as Variated of Democracies (V-DEM) dataset (2019) and Cheibub, Gandhi, 
and Vreeland's (2010) dataset. However, in the case of V-DEM, ideology 
(v2exl_legitideolcr) is expressed in terms of claims used by the leader to legitimize their 
position in power. As the scope of this dissertation is not to shed lights on variations in 
legitimation clams, this indicator does not seem appropriate. Regarding Cheibub, Gandhi, 
and Vreeland 's (2010) dataset instead, data for ideology cover only half of the time-span 
under investigation as it ends in 2008. Having said so therefore, the DPI indicator on 











In addition to the above-mentioned variables, it is highly reasonable to assume that the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables is influenced by other factors. 
In particular, I assume that military expenditure, ethnic fractionalization and population 
size would mitigate the effects of the covariates on the dependent variables.   
 Some scholars argue that the extent of to which an authoritarian regime is repressive 
affects social policy decisions. While analysing trajectories of social spending in Latin 
America between 1970 and 2000, Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) find evidence 
that most repressive authoritarian regimes - in terms of human rights violations - tend to 
keep public spending in health and education quite low compared to less repressive 
regimes. According to the authors, highly repressive regimes are interested in suppressing 
potential mobilization of lower classes and blue-collar unions which are usually the 
beneficiaries of public health and education services. Similarly, Pribble (2011) argues 
that most repressive authoritarian regimes in Latin America from 1990s to early 2000s 
have lower levels of coverage in both risk prevention policies –policies that seeks to 
prevent social risks via investment in human capital – and risk coping programs – policies 
that address risk through subsidies and direct intervention. That being said, it is 
reasonable to expect that military spending would negatively influence the level of social 
spending across authoritarian regimes. For this reason, I include a continuous variable 
that accounts for the level of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Data are 
collected from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2018)19 and include all current and 
capital expenditures on armed forces, defence ministries and paramilitary forces.  
  Many scholars however, pinpoint to the importance of ethnic fractionalization in 
affecting social policy both directly and indirectly. First, ethnic homogeneity is associated 
with higher degrees of trade union organization (Huber and Stephens 2001) which reflects 
larger and stronger opposition groups. In the case of ethnically divided societies, 
opposition groups tend to be segmented and thus, have lower probability to access and 
influence policy decisions. Second, Easterly et al. (2003) demonstrate that ethnic and 
linguistic fractionalization variables are very likely to determine both economic success 
in terms of GDP growth and measures of welfare and policy quality. In light of these 
 
19 Please, find here the link to the dataset https://www.sipri.org/databases 
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contributions, I expect that more ethnically divided society would spend less in social 
provision as members of the ruling coalition belong to the dominant ethnic group. To this 
end, I include a variable for ethnic fractionalization which captures differences in racial 
and linguistic characteristics within a country’s population. The variable is  continuous 
but bounded between 0 and 1.  
 Finally, I include two control variables for the amount of population. In particular, 
I add a percentage for the amount of population that is 65 years and older on the total 
population and the percentage of the total population which is under 14 years old. It is in  
fact, mostly likely that an older population would positively affect the demand for health 
services while a younger population would shape demand for education expenditure 




4.3 Estimation Technique 
 
There has been an intense debate about the appropriate model and estimation technique 
to analyse time-series cross sectional (TSCS) for many years on. TSCS  data consist of 
“repeated observations (often annual) on the same fixed political units (usually countries 
or states)” (Beck 2001). In TSCS data the number of units is fixed and all inferences of 
interest are condition on the observed units (Beck 2001). The advantage of using TSCS 
data is that it combines the possibility to study inter-unit differences (cross-sectional 
analysis) with intra-unit dynamics (time-series analysis). A very common and widely 
used technique in comparative social policy research is to model TSCS data using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. OLS however, produces unbiased and efficient 
estimators if the error process meets the Gauss-Markov assumptions. That is, errors in all 
regressions should be independent and identically distributed across all units (Raffalovich 
and Chung 2014). Those conditions however, are most of the time violated in TSCS data 
(Janoski and Hicks 1994) and thus, the literature points to three problems that should be 
addressed when using pooled OLS regressions for TSCS data.  
The first issue relates to the temporal dynamics in the error term. OLS would 
produce unbiased but inefficient estimates if there is serial correlation in the error terms. 
Serial correlation refers to the correlation of the errors for one country with previous 
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errors of the same country. Granger and Newbold (1974) demonstrate that if we don’t 
take into account the autocorrelation structure of the errors from the regression equations, 
we may end up with a model that produces spurious correlation. (Beck and Katz 1995) 
suggest two specifications to handle the temporal dynamic process in TSCS data: control 
for serial correlation by either modelling on a first-order autoregressive (AR1) process or 
adding the lagged dependent on the right-side of the equation (LDV). Both specifications 
are two cases of a  more general Autoregressive Distributive Lag model (ARDL) which 
has been widely used in the literature on social policy (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 2017; Wibbels 2006).  
Both the second and the third issues instead, deal with problems of cross-sectional 
variability. More specifically, the second problem refers to the contemporaneous 
correlation of the errors across units. That is, the error term for one country may be 
correlated with the errors for other countries at the same point in time. Contemporaneous 
correlation is very common in TSCS data and is usually caused by the presence of time-
invariant unit characteristics. To avoid this problem, Beck and Katz (1995) propose to 
combine ARDL with a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) specification when using 
pooled OLS regressions. The authors however, also posit that PCSE specification leads 
to unbiased estimators in the case of panel heteroskedasticity - different variance in the 
error term across units. In fact, they argue that PCSE produce efficient estimators when 
unit-specific effects are deterministic and they are not correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. In other words, PCSE produces efficient estimators when units and 
contemporaneous heteroskedasticity stay the same over time. 
 
 
4.4 Model Specifications  
 
The model specifications discussed in this section refer to the elaboration of the 
appropriate model to analyse both political and economic determinants of public health 
and education expenditure. In doing so, I build on Beck and Katz (1995, 2011) approach 
and consider the implications of using models in level or in change. In attrition, extensive 
attention is devoted to model the temporal dimension and serial correlation in the data at 
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hand. Finally, I address problems of missingness in education expenditure and develop a 
multiple imputation technique to deal with such issue.   
 
Dependent Variable: Levels vs Change   
 
In addition to the above-mentioned econometrics problems of serial and spatial 
correlation and panel heteroskedasticity, the literature on social policy highlights another 
problem that needs to be addressed when using pooled time series analysis to estimate 
the effect of the determinants of social spending. Some scholars estimates models in 
differences by using change from year to year in social spending as dependent variable 
(Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 2017; Wibbels 2006) 
while others estimate models in levels (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Huber, 
Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Huber and Stephens 2001). As Martín-Mayoral and Sastre 
(2017) rightly put it, the difference between estimate models in levels or in change 
depends on both theoretical and methodological considerations that refer to (1) the 
research question (2) the expectations about the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables and (3) econometrics issues.  
Regarding the first issue, the research question that animates this work is to 
investigate the determinants of long-term changes across countries. That is, why do some 
authoritarian regimes spend more on average in health and education than other non-
democratic regimes? To this end then, the level of social spending seems to be a better 
indicator than yearly change data as the latter best captures short-term policy choice in 
social spending while models in levels provide a better picture of the long-term effect of 
the determinants of public social expenditure (Huber and Stephens 2001). Second, 
expectations about the relationship between independent and dependent variables point 
to levels rather than changes. As we have seen in the previous chapter, I hypothesized 
that all the economic variables – GDP growth, GDP per capita, oil and gas income per 
capita and trade openness – affect levels of public spending. Third, the decision between 
using models in level and change also depends on the existence of serial correlation in 
the error terms which may lead to underestimation of the standard errors. I discuss this 







There are several specification for time-series model and it important to adequately 
address them at the outset. The generic static specification for TSCS data is: 
 
 
 Yit =  Xit ß +  +  εi,t     
 
Where Yit is the dependent variable and Xit is the vector of all the covariates. This 
specification is static as changes in the covariates instantaneously affect the dependent 
variable with no delayed effect. However, as discussed above, serial correlation is very 
common in TSCS data and static models seldom match the reality. Beck and Katz (2011) 
suggest to use either a serially correlated error (SCE) model or a lagged dependent 
variable (LDV)  approach to handle temporal dynamics in TSCS data. Serially correlated 
error model: 
 
Yit =  Xit ß + Yi,t-1  pøp + νi,t + εi,t                       
 
 
assumes that the error term  νi,t + εi,t  follows a first-order autoregressive (AR1) process.  
Though similarly to the static model, the vector of the covariates Xit   is supposed to have 
an immediate effect on Y. This model is useful when it is possible to assume that the 
effect of X is immediate as well as empirical evidence that there is an AR1 process in the 
error term. The lagged dependent variable (LDV) model instead, allows for more 
flexibility in the error term. In particular, the LDV model 
 
Yit =  Xit ß + Yi,t-1 øp  + γ xi,t−1 + εi,t 
 
 
assumes that the effect of X decays geometrically over time although, it never  completely 
disappears. Differently from a AR1 model then, the effect of the covariates in the LDV 
model is not immediate and remains over certain periods.  
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  χ2  statistic p-value 
Health 
No trend  197.92 0.261 
Trend  294.39 0.000 
Education 
No trend  115.94 0.057 
Trend  229.093 0.000 
Table 5 Panel unit root for health and education expenditure 
Source: Quality of Government Dataset (QoG) 2018  
 
 
The difference between an AR1 model and a LDV model is almost negligible. In 
particular, Beck and Katz (2004, 17) argue that “there is literally no difference whether 
one uses the AR1 error model or the LDV model in terms of whether the model has a 
lagged dependent variable” because both of them have a lagged dependent variable on 
the right-side of the equation and correct for serial correlation in the error therm.Yet, their 
work has sparked some discussion on the use of the lagged dependent variable in TSCS 
models. Achon (2000) for instance, demonstrates that if there is a trend in the data, the 
use of a lagged dependent variable suppresses the explanatory power of other covariates. 
Similarly, Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) suggest to use a first-order 
autoregressive model (AR1) since it already corrects for serial correlation in the error 
process. 
In light of these considerations, I conduct a Im–Pesaran–Shin panel unit root test 
on my data to check whether there is serial correlation in the error terms. I chose this test 
as it accounts for different autoregressive processes across the units. Table 4 reports the 
findings for various specifications of the test. As we can see, when time trend is included, 
the p-value for both health and education is essentially zero and thus, it is possible to 
reject the null hypothesis that all series have a unit root. The conclusions from the test 
specifications suggest that the series are trend stationary and an autoregressive process of 
order 1 in the error term (AR1).  
 
 
The Model  
 
Following the methodological considerations discussed above, the model presented here 
is based on pooled OLS regressions correcting for first-order autoregressive process – the 
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value of Y at time t depends on the values of Y at time t-1 – and panel-corrected standard 
error estimates. In addition, as the augmented Im–Pesaran–Shin panel unit root test 
detects a time-trend in both health and education, I include time dummies for lustrous 
periods such as 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010, 2010-2014. Overall, the general 
version of the model can be specified as follows: 
 
 
                    q 
ΔYit =  Dα + tθ + Xit ß +  Yi,t-1  pøp + ∑ εi,t  – qpq +  εi,t 
                   q=1 
 
 
where ΔYi,t is the dependent variable and refers to the difference between Yi,t and Yi,t-1  
where Y refers to either level of public expenditure in health or in education as a 
percentage of GDP in country i in time t. Xit is a vector of covariates for unit i in time t 
and ß is the vector of paraments that apply to Xit. Dα is a vector for country dummy 
variables (or fixed-effect) and tθ is the time trend which is captured by lustrous dummy 
variables. The stochastic component of the model distinguishes between two components: 
(1) ∑εi,t – qpq : is the sum of unobserved factors specific for the unit i in time t and (2)  εi,t  
is the white-noise for the model and specific to the time point and unit. Finally, øp is the 
autoregressive parameter that applies to the effect of the dependent variable Yit .  
In addition, I include country-fixed-effects in the model for two reasons. First, both 
the Hausman test which compares the fixed versus random effects  models, and the Wald 
test show significance levels for country-fixed effects suggesting that this model should 
be preferred. Second, the inclusion of country-fixed effects allows us to control for 
potential omitted variable bias. In fact, when including country-fixed effects, I assume 
that there is some variation in the dependent variable that is not captured by the covariates 
and depends on the inner characteristics of the countries.  
Overall, I develop two models that corrects for spatial correlation and 
contemporaneous correlation with panel-specific error correction (PCSE) estimates for 
the error term in each panel. Yet one model accounts for serial correlation by following 
an first-order autoregressive process (AR1) and panel-specific autocorrelation structure 
while a second model deals with serial correlation using the autoregressive distributive 
(ADL) approach and thus, including the lag of the dependent variables as a regressor. As 
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discussed above, the difference between these two models is almost neglectable as they 
both correct for serial correlation but they differ in the extent to which the effect of the 
covariates on the dependent variable changes over time. In both models, I include 
country-dummies to control for omitted time-invariant variables and lustrous-dummies 
to account for the time-trend.  
   
 
Robustness check  
 
To check for robustness in the results, I develop additional models based on OLS-
regressions with fixed-effects and robust-cluster estimators for standard errors. Fixed-
effects in particular, control for unobserved characteristics of the countries that are 
assumed to be time-invariant while robust-cluster variance estimators deals with panel 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. More specifically, robust-
cluster estimators is a variant of the Eicker-Huber-White estimator which controls for 
heteroskedasticity in the standard error and remains valid also in the presence of serial 
correlations of the error terms within unit (Roger 1993). Though, while robust-cluster 
estimators are valid to control for within country variation, they provide biased 
coefficients in the case of correlation in the error terms between units. Yet lustrous-
dummies and fixed-effects help to deal with such problem. In particular, fixed-effects 
control for potential omitted variable bias and country-specific factors while time-
dummies deal with the effect of the covariates on dependent variables in all units at the 
same point in time.  Estimators for fixed-effects models with robust-cluster standard error 
are summarized in Table 7 and 8.  
 Overall, the robust-cluster OLS estimators do not provide different results. All 
variables of interests show the same effects as in the case of PCSE estimators but there 
are only some changes in the levels of significance across the variables. For instance, 
estimated coefficients for GDP per capita, GDP growth and oil and gas production per 
capita are always significant together with estimates for one-party. Interestingly, results 
for political ideology differ suggesting that central-wing autocracies have higher levels 
of education spending compared to other regimes. Though, once accounted for fixed-
effects, this coefficient is not statistically significant. Therefore, it is possible to conclude 
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that both OLS robust-cluster estimators and PCSE estimators do not differ in their results 
once accounted for fixed-effects and time-effects.  
 
 
4.5 Dealing with the Missing Values Problem: Multiple 
Imputation Technique  
 
Before proceeding with empirical analysis, there are some problems that should be 
carefully addressed. First, despite the effort of having a complete dataset, there are some 
countries that have no data on either health or education expenditure such as North Korea 
and Somalia and which are therefore, excluded from the panel sample size. Second, the 
time-series for health and education expenditure varies very much in terms of 
missingness. While the time-series for public health expenditure has only 23 missing 
values (1.24 % of the total panel sample size) 20, the time-series for public education 
expenditure presents more than 45 % of missing (see Table 6).  
Missing values are a recurrent issue in large-N studies on comparative research but 
they should be address accordingly. Scholars identify two problems associated with 
missingness (Little and Rubin 2002; Luengo, Sáez, and Herrera 2012). First, missing 
values reduce the overall sample size and produce a loss of valuable information for the 
variables of interest. Second, missing values may lead to severe selection bias and 
overestimations of the parameters. Many scholars in fact, point out to the effect of missing 
values on their contributions’ empirical evidence (Rodrik 1998; M. Ross 2006; Timmons 
2005).  One way to deal with missing values is listwise deletion which consist in deleting 
all the observations for which there are missing values. According to King et al. (2001), 
listwise deletion is a preferable technique of dealing with missingness if 1) the analysis 
model a linear relationship between X and Y  2) there are no variables in the dataset that 
could be used to collect information about missing values 3) missingness of covariates in 
the analysis model is not a function of dependent variable and 4) the number of 
observations that are left after listwise deletion should be so large that the loss of  
 
 
20   Missing values refers to five countries: Afghanistan (1995-2001), Iraq (1995- 2002), Liberia  










Total Obs Percentage of Missing 
Health Expenditure 93 23 1860 1.24 
Education Expenditure 93 914 1860 49.14 
Education expenditure  
(with listwise deletion) 87
 a 0 946 0 
Education expenditure  
(with multiple imputation)  60
b 0 1200 0 
Table 6 Patterns of missing data for public health and education expenditure 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the Quality of Government Dataset (QoG) 2018 
Note: a The panel sample includes also one country-year observation in education expenditure 
 b The sample includes only countries with more than 7  obs in education expenditure. 
 
 
efficiency from listwise deletion does not create biases induced by other conditions (i.e. 
loss of information for other covariates).  
First, I assume that there is a linear relationship between Y - public education 
expenditures  - and some of the covariates in the model 21 and the third condition is not a 
concern in my data as some missing values follow a pattern of missing completely at 
random (MCAR). There are six countries for which there is no data for the entire time 
period of investigation22, five countries for which there is one country-year observation23 
and three countries for which there are only two country-year observations24. For this 
reason, those countries are excluded from the panel sample when analysing patterns of 
education expenditure.  Conditions two and four should be taken into account seriously. 
For what concerns condition two – availability of variables to collect information for 
imputing missing values – it is reasonable to believe that the dataset includes some 
variables that can be used to collect such information. As King et al. (2001) suggest, most 
datasets in political science have already information about patterns of missing values. 
Following this logic, I find that data on private education spending, health expenditures 
 
21   Please, refer to the next sections where I discuss model specifications 
22  Those countries are Bosnia Herzegovina, Haiti, Iraq, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and  
 Uzbekistan.  
23  Those countries are Algeria, Libya, Myanmar, Turkmenistan and United Arab Emirates. 
24  Those countries are Democratic Republic of Congo, Honduras and Liberia 
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and population size are correlated with patterns of education expenditure and therefore, 
can be used to collect information about such variable25. Regarding the four condition 
instead, Table 6 summarizes the number of countries and the total amount of country-
year observations for education expenditure in the case of listwise deletion. As we can 
see the number of countries drops from 93 to 79. In addition, the overall sample size 
shrinks from 1860observations to less than 950 observations leading to a loss of valuable 
information for other covariates (49% of missingness) . Hence, since conditions two and 
four are not met, listwise deletion does not seem to be the appropriate technique to model 
missing values in my dataset. 
 King et al. (2001) propose a different approach to deal with missing data problems 
and which builds on the concept of multiple imputations. This approach has been 
extensively used by social scientists dealing with missingness in time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) data (Manly and Wells 2015; Penn 2007; Schenker et al. 2006; 
Stasavage 2005). The overall logic behind multiple imputation technique is to extract 
information from the already observed variable in the dataset via a statistical model and 
then, impute the missing values based on the information extracted. According to King et 
al. (2001), the most important assumption in order to use multiple imputation is that 
missing values should be missing completely at random (MCAR). This means that 
patterns of missingness should be uncorrelated with all the other variables in the model 
and therefore, missing is purely at random (King et al. 2001). After a careful analysis on 
patterns of missingness in my data, I argue that those patterns follow a MCAR process as 
missing values do not depend on none of the variables of interest26 (Please refer to Table 
A.3 and A.4 in Appendix for a graphical representation of the distribution of the missing 
values across regime types and regions).  
Honaker and King (2010) suggest a two-step approach to multiple imputation. First, 
they suggest to impute m values for each missing items and create M completed datasets. 
In order to do so, a fundamental assumption is that variables are jointly multivariate 
 
25 Those variable that refer to education spending in the private sector ( wdi_expedus; wdi_expedut) and 
health expenditure ( wdi_exph, wdi_exphpu) and population size (unna_pop, wdi_pop14 wdi_pop1564)  
from QoG Dataset   
26  Countries excluded from the imputation as missing values are more than half of the time period: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Haiti, Iraq, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Libya,        
Myanmar,Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Democratic Republic of Congo, Honduras, Liberia  
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normal27 and therefore, missing values can be imputed linearly on any of the variables 
that are in the dataset and are correlated with the missing values of the variable of interest. 
This procedure produces M imputed dataset which give measures of the central tendency 
of the missing cases and the uncertainty about them. The second step consists in running 
a statistical method that we would use in case of no missing values on each of the M 
imputed dataset. To this end, they advise to use a predictive model that is based on the 
expectation maximization (EM) method and which simulates random draws of coefficient 
estimates (Øm) and variance-covariance matrix V(Øm) on posterior distribution for each 
model M. Finally, they suggest to combine all M simulated paraments into one single 
matrix. In order to make things easier, they elaborated a software package called Amelia 
II which allows to combine the second step in one single syntax for the R statistical 
software28. This procedure has the advantage to deal with 1) dataset where missing values 
are endemic (i.e. countries do not collect information because it is costly)  2) missingness 
problems in the data structures that differ very much from the overall sample population 
(i.e. exclusion of some countries from the analysis though countries that they are 
classified as autocracies). Overall then, according to Honaker and King (2010), using 
multiple imputation with a predictive model based on EM algorithm would produce more 
accurate imputations, increase the efficiency of the estimators and reduce bias.  
Built on this logic, I adopt a similar approach to overcome the problem of missing 
values for public education expenditure. The first step is to impute the missing values for 
the dependent variable by using multivariate normal regression on other observed 
variables that provide information about patterns of missingness. Following this logic, I 
use all the variables in my dataset29 to create m imputation (m= 914) and twenty-five new 
imputed datasets (M =25)30. Collectively, those dataset give measures of the central  
 
27  Although variables are not perfectly normally distributed, the authors argue that ‘if there exists 
information in the observed data that can be used to predict missing data, multiple imputation from this 
normal model will always dominate current practice’  
28  This package has been elaborated for the R statistical software. Yet, the authors have subsequently 
elaborated a script for the STATA statistical software as well (see https://gking.harvard.edu/amelia)  
29  Honaker and King (2010) suggest to use all the variable in the dataset to maximize the information in 
the dataset and compute more reliable estimations for the MI values. Also, EM algorithm takes more 
information from the variables that are more correlated with the variable of interest than from the less 
correlated ones.  
30 There is not a rule of thumb for the right amount of imputation that should be conducted. Though, 
Honaker and King (2010) demonstrate that already 5 or 10 imputed dataset provide unbiased and efficient  




Figure 4.3 Public education expenditure in the case of listwise deletion 





Figure 4.4 Public education expenditure with mean imputed values 





tendency of the missing cases and the uncertainty about them. Subsequently, I run the 
regression on each of the imputed dataset M to compute estimates of the variables of 
interest. 
Importantly, the number of observations for each country should be higher than the 
number of parameters used for imputation and therefore, I have to drop all countries that  
report less than 7 observations for the variable of interest. Finally, I simulate random draw 
the coefficients and standard errors for each of the M analysis and I combine the results 
into the points estimates for the parameter of the statistical model.  
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 provide a descriptive evidence of the difference between listwise 
deletion and multiple imputation data in four countries. Fig. 10 shows the level of public 
education expenditure in Belarus, Cameroon, Indonesia and Colombia in the case of 
listwise deletion. As we can see, there are several missing values in each country. 
However, we can see that there is a clear pattern in each of the country of interest. It thus, 
seems reasonable to assume that values for public education expenditure do not vary from 
one year to another but there is a trend in the time series. Figure 11 shows the imputed 
values for the same countries. The rhombus sets the mean imputation value while the bar 
shows the confidence intervals at level 95% from each imputed value. Both figure shows 
how confidence intervals capture 95% of the correct points estimates for the dependent 
variable. It is important to bear in mind that, when using the approach proposed by 
Honaker and King (2010), we impute missing values conditional on the structure of the 
dataset and simulate random draw using a maximum likelihood estimation. Therefore, it 
is an iterative process that is very time consuming. 
 
 
4.6 Empirical Analysis 
 
 
Determinants of health expenditure  
 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients for the levels of health expenditure in four 
models. Model 1 is the baseline model while Model 2 reports the estimated coefficients 
of OLS regressions with fixed-effects and robust-cluster estimators for standard errors. 
Model 3 and 4 instead, are the complete models as they estimate the coefficients using 




OLS  FE PCSE  PCSE (LDV) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Health expenditure (t -1)    0.564*** 
    (0.0603) 
GDP growth  -0.0116*** -0.0108*** -0.00811** -0.0102*** 
 (0.00409) (0.00414) (0.00330) (0.00334) 
Δ GDP p.c. 0.450* 0.255** 0.213*** 0.340** 
 (0.771) (0.911) (1.163) (0.648) 
Δ GDP p.c.2 -0.0612* -0.112* -0.192*** -0.0826** 
 (0.0480) (0.0579) (0.0729) (0.0402) 
Δ Oil and gas production p.c.  -0.0985*** -0.0970*** -0.128*** -0.0837*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0349) (0.0320) (0.0302) 
Δ Trade Openness  0.229** 0.128 0.175 0.115 
 (0.112) (0.121) (0.114) (0.0913) 
Size of the winning coalition      
  Military 0.387 0.050 0.017 0.096 
 (0.125) (0.284) (0.145) (0.156) 
  Civilian  0.297 0.468 0.313** 0.391* 
 (0.263) (0.295) (0.168) (0.172) 
Level of institutionalization     
   No-party 0.0814 0.0756 0.195 0.0359 
 (0.176) (0.177) (0.108) (0.111) 
   One-party 0.384*** 0.400*** 0.0316** 0.392* 
 (0.143) (0.146) (0.0822) (0.0740) 
   Limited-multiparty 0.0372 0.0456 0.0312 0.0356 
 (0.0401) (0.0405) (0.0390) (0.0412) 
Political Ideology     
    Right 0.843* 0.882* 0.555* 0.813 
 (0.0962) (0.0984) (0.0876) (0.0594) 
   Centre -0.291** -0.266** -0.213 -0.0115 
 (0.113) (0.116) (0.108) (0.0726) 
    Left 0.0143 0.0141 0.0526 0.0331 
 (0.0790) (0.0808) (0.0676) (0.0520) 
Democratic experience  0.0540**  0.0825*** 0.018** 
 (0.0226)  (0.279) (0.134) 
Δ Military expenditure  0.132*** 0.158*** 0.284*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0495) (0.0514) (0.0530) (0.0433) 
Population (65>) 0.0682* 0.108** 0.155*** 0.00872 
 (0.0358) (0.0509) (0.0566) (0.0368) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.0214  -0.598*** -0.930* 
 (0.570)  (0.924) (3.083) 
Constant -0.748** -1.39** -0.44** -0.279 
 (1.186) (0.497) (1.765) (1.690) 
Country-effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time-effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,443 1,443 1,443 1,443 
Time-period 1995-2014 1995-2014 1995-2014 1995-2014 
Number of countries 87 87 87 87 
Table 7 Estimated error-correction model: determinants of health expenditure 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses with standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Reference category for size of the winning coalition is monarchy; Reference category for level of 
institutionalization is  
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All the time-variant independent and control variables have been lagged by one year to 
avoid problems of endogeneity and spurious correlation. Model 3 and 4 controls for 
country-effects which, as discussed above, allow to control for potential omitted variable 
bias. Overall then, the results that are that are shown in Model 3 and 4 are more 
conservative but, at the same time, more accurate. 
As we can see, all models report negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for GDP growth suggesting that countries with higher levels of GDP tend to spend less 
than countries with lower levels of GDP growth. Interestingly, GDP per capita is positive 
and statistically significant and therefore, positive changes in GDP per capita are 
correlated with positive changes in health expenditure. However, as hypothesized, the 
square term of GDP per capita is also statistically significant but negative. This suggests 
that the effect of GDP per capita is not linear and tend to be inverse for countries that 
have higher levels of economic performance. This results validates the hypothesis that 
GDP per capita is not linear correlated with health expenditure but the relationship 
follows an inverse U-shape curve.  
 The analysis also shows that natural resource abundance plays a rule in public 
health expenditure. In all models in fact, the coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant suggesting that rent-seeking autocracies spend less in health than resource-
poor autocracies. In addition, contrary to what hypothesized, trade openness is positive 
and statistically significant only in Model 1 while there the estimated coefficients in other 
models although positive are not statistically significant.   
 Regarding the political factors, the type of the winning coalition weakly predicts  
patterns of health expenditure. More specifically, the coefficients for civilian 
dictatorships is positive and statistically significant in Model 3 and 4 suggesting that 
civilian dictatorships spend more in health than monarchies. Yet, H4.a. is only partially 
confirmed as there is a no difference in the level of health spending between monarchies 
and  military regimes. Instead, results for the level of institutionalization show a specific 
patterns: estimated coefficients for one-party regimes are  positive and statistically 
significant in all the four models. Additionally, results for political ideology corroborate 
the H6. Model 1, 2 and 3 in fact, show that right-wing autocracies spend more than all 
other autocracies in health sector though, the coefficient is not significant in Model 4.  
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Democratic experience is positive and significant in Model 1, 3 and 4 leading to the 
conclusion that more years of democracy are correlated with higher levels of health 
spending.  
Interestingly, different from what hypothesized, changes in military spending are 
positive and statistically significant across all models suggesting that autocracies that 
spend more in military sector also spend more in healthcare compared to other 
autocracies. This may be explained by the fact that military expenditure does not only 
capture the level of repression within the country but also the amount of resources devoted 
to military actions. Countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, Rwanda Congo, Iraq, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina that have underwent to civil wars during the period under investigation, 
also report higher levels of social spending in healthcare sectors. Finally, as expected 
ethnic fractionalization is negative and statistically significant in Model 3. That is, more 
divided autocracies tend to spend less than more homogeneous societies. Finally, aged 
population  is positive and statistically significant in Model 1, 2 and 3.  
Overall then, Model 1 and 2 analyses the determinants of health expenditure using 
simple OLS regressions with (Model 2) and without fixed-effects (Model 1). Instead, 
Model 3 and 4 uses OLS regressions with PCSE estimation technique. Yet, Model 3 deals  
with serial correlation by employing a first-order autoregressive process (AR1) while 
Model 4 uses the lagged-dependent variable (LDV) approach. Those models are more 
conservative but, at the same time, more accurate than the other ones.  
 
 
Determinants of education expenditure  
 
Table 8 summaries the results for education expenditure using the multiple imputation 
technique as discussed above. The models are constructed following exactly the same 
logic as the previous ones. Overall, we see that the coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and statistically significant in Model 4 suggesting that previous values 
of education expenditure are positively correlated with current values of education 
expenditure, as expected. Similar to health expenditure, GDP growth is negative and 
statistically significant all models while GDP per capita is positive and statistically 






OLS  FE PCSE (AR1) PCSE (LDV) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Education expenditure (t -1)    0.453*** 
    (0.0995) 
GDP growth  -0.0252*** -0.0247*** -0.0174*** -0.0223*** 
 (0.00715) (0.00720) (0.00580) (0.00535) 
Δ GDP p.c. 0.972*** 0.169*** 0.280** 0.613** 
 (1.502) (1.663) (1.981) (1.718) 
Δ GDP p.c.2 -0.504*** -0.585*** -0.289** -0.238** 
 (0.0942) (0.103) (0.120) (0.103) 
Δ Oil and gas production p.c.  -0.163** -0.177* -0.295*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0778) (0.0949) (0.0713) (0.0616) 
Δ Trade Openness  0.245 0.0737 -0.151 -0.365 
 (0.213) (0.229) (0.254) (0.204) 
Size of the winning coalition      
  Military - 0.745** -0.867** -0.660** -0.231** 
 (0.492) (0.639) (0.928) (0.860) 
  Civilian  -0.635 -0.575 -0.394 -0.00233 
 (0.710) (0.738) (0.969) (0.889) 
Level of institutionalization     
   No-party 0.329 0.129 0.0493 0.0481 
 (0.430) (0.427) (0.340) (0.430) 
   One-party 0.373** 0.338* 0.287** 0.0842** 
 (0.310) (0.322) (0.260) (0.290) 
   Limited-multiparty 0.0944 0.0397 0.0275 0.0211 
 (0.0694) (0.0706) (0.0675) (0.0761) 
Political Ideology     
    Right -0.546*** -0.512*** -0.540*** -0.363*** 
 (0.157) (0.164) (0.177) (0.138) 
   Centre -0.555* -0.723 -0.246 -0.246 
 (0.241) (0.253) (0.220) (0.185) 
    Left 0.156* 0.157* 0.244** 0.274* 
 (0.181) (0.189) (0.170) (0.177) 
Democratic experience  0.00544  0.017*** 0.063*** 
 (0.0280)  (0.303) (0.209) 
Δ Military expenditure  0.276*** 0.352*** 0.559*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0848) (0.0899) (0.106) (0.0788) 
Population (<14) -0.0428 0.0653 0.0701 0.0362 
 (0.0467) (0.0795) (0.0703) (0.0550) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.328  -0.58*** -0.78*** 
 (0.704)  (4.958) (4.577) 
Constant 0.0684 0.0459 0.392 0.172* 
 (0.915) (0.163) (0.860) (4.526) 
Country-effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time-effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 987 987 987 956 
Time-period 1995-2014 1995-2014 1995-2014 1995-2014 
Number of countries 76 76 76 70 
Table 8 Estimated error-correction model: determinants of education expenditure 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses with standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Reference category for size of the winning coalition is monarchy; Reference category for level of 
institutionalization is traditional regime; Reference category for ideology is no-ideology. 
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This result supports the evidence that economic performance, expressed in terms of 
changes of GDP per capita, positively influenced education expenditure  but its effects 
tend to dissipate over the long-run. As in the case of health expenditure, those estimated 
coefficients confirm a non-linear effects of GDP per capita on education expenditure.  
Regarding political factors, estimated coefficients for military dictatorships are 
statistically significant and negative. Military regimes are in fact, correlated with lower 
levels of education expenditure compared to monarchies as well as civilian dictatorships 
who are negatively correlated with education expenditure but their coefficients are not 
significant. The level of institutionalization instead, is positive correlated with the level 
of spending in education as one-party and limited-multiparty regimes have higher levels 
of spending compared to traditional regime types. However, only estimated coefficients 
for one-party regimes are statistically significant.  
Similar to the case of healthcare sector, political ideology does play a pivotal role 
in partially explaining patterns of education expenditure. In particular, right-wing 
governments are correlated to lower levels of education compared to other ideology-led 
governments. Finally, democratic experience is positive and significant in Model 1, 3 and 
4. Similar to the case of healthcare sector, military spending is positively correlated with 




4.7 Further Analysis 
 
 
Economic variables   
 
In light of such considerations, it is important to investigate the effect of GDP per capita 
on health and education expenditure. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is highly 
reasonable to expect that the effect of  GDP per capita on social spending is influenced 
by oil-wealth and trade-openness. Thus, a further analysis is conducted to assess whether 
GDP per capita has a non-linear effect on both health and education expenditure, once 
controlled for the level of oil and gas production.   
Table 9 and 10 show the interaction effects between oil and gas production per 
capita and GDP per capita on health and education expenditure. As we can see from both  
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 Oil and Gas production p.c. 
 Low High 
   
GDP growth  -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Δ GDP p.c. 0.63 2.00** 
 (0.00) (0.89) 
Δ GDP p.c. 2 -0.01 -0.12** 
 (0.00) (0.05) 
   
Observations 838 821 
R-squared 0.67 0.84 
Number of countries  55 51 
Table 9 Effect on level of health expenditure: Interaction analysis of 
oil and gas production per capita and GDP per capita.  




Oil and Gas production p.c. 
 Low High 
   
GDP growth  -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Δ GDP p.c. 6.36*** 3.84** 
 (1.37) (1.75) 
Δ GDP p.c. 2 -0.40*** -0.26** 
 (0.09) (0.11) 
   
Observations 463 419 
R-squared 0.94 0.93 
Number of countries  50 44 
Table 10  Effect on level of education expenditure: Interaction 
analysis of oil and gas production per capita and GDP per capita. 





tables there are two conclusions that can be drawn. First, there is no effect of GDP per 
capita on health expenditure in the case of resource-poor countries while, it has a non-
linear effect on resource-rich countries. In particular, positive changes in GDP per capita 
are associated with an increase in the level of health expenditure for oil-and-gas 
producing autocracies but such effect is lessoned as over time. Second, there is a similar 
non-linear effect on education expenditure in both resource-poor and resource-rich 
countries suggesting that there is no difference in the effect of GDP per capita on 
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education expenditure across rentier and non-rentier states. Overall then, the effect of 
economic performance expressed in terms of GDP per capita on both health and education 
expenditure in not linear but such relation is expressed in a quadratic curve. Furthermore, 
effect of GDP per capita on education expenditure is similar in resource-rich autocracies 
and resource-poor autocracies but not in the case of health expenditure. A positive 
increase in GDP per capita is reflected in higher levels of spending in the short-run in 
rentier states but there is no effect on resource-poor autocracies.  
 
 
Political variables  
 
 
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 report the marginal effect of independent political and institutional 
variables on both health an education spending. Those coefficients are taken the LDV 
model, as illustrated above in Table 7 and 8. Figure 4.5 shows that there is no effect of 
military regimes on health expenditure while civilian dictatorships have a positive effect 
on health expenditure. Surprisingly, the level of institutionalization only partially explain 
social spending. While more institutionalized regimes such as no-party, one-party and 
limited-multiparty regimes tend to spend more in healthcare compared to traditional 
types, limited-multiparty regimes spend less then regimes with lower levels of party 
competition such as one-party regimes. In particular, the effect of one-party regimes is 
positive and significant compared to all other regimes. Furthermore, there is a significant 
impact of democratic experience on health expenditure. That is, countries that have 
undergone through a process of democratisation differ from long-living autocracies in 
terms of health and education expenditure. Finally, as hypothesized, right-wing political 
ideology has a positive marginal effect on health expenditure while left-wing regimes 
tend to spend more in education sector.  
 Figure 4.6 shows the marginal effects of the same variables for the levels of 
education expenditure. Differently from health sector, the size of the winning coalition 
has a negative effect on education expenditure. Military and civilian dictators in fact, have 
a negative impact on education spending. Instead, as noted before, the level of 
institutionalization influences education spending. Both one-party regimes and limited-













hypothesized, left-wing governments spend more than right-wing governments since 
their effect on education expenditure is positive while the effect for right-wing 
government is the opposite. Finally, as for health expenditure, there is a weak positive 




4.8 Discussion  
 
 
Overall this chapter tests whether hypothesized effect of political and economic factors 
influence patterns of social spending in authoritarian regimes. The empirical analysis 
demonstrates that (1) public spending in health and education is sticky and follows a time-
trend because previous values of public expenditure capture most of the current variation 
(2) the effect of political and economic factors on health spending differ from that on 
education expenditure. Table 11 and 12  summarize the findings in relation to the 
hypotheses elaborated in Chapter 3.  
Economic performance – expressed in terms of GDP per capita and GDP growth – 
has an effect on both public spending in health and education. That is, higher levels of 
GDP growth are negatively associated with public spending in health and education while 
GDP per capita has a non-linear effect on spending in both sectors. Additionally, while 
Ross (1999) argues that rentier states have higher levels of social spending as they can 
distribute their rents directly out of their pockets, the empirical analysis in this chapter 
demonstrates that authoritarian regimes with higher levels of oil and gas production per 
capita display significant lower levels of public spending. Contrary to the rentier state 
theory therefore, authoritarian regimes do not use rents from the production of oil and gas 
to more distribute more benefits to their population.  
Regarding the political factors, the empirical analysis demonstrates that autocratic 
institutions have a different impact on policy decisions. Electoral regimes such as one-
party and limited-multipart display higher levels of both health and education expenditure 
yet, higher levels of party competition is not associated higher levels of spending. One-
party regimes in fact, have significant high levels of public health and education 
compared to limited-multiparty regimes. That being said, compared to all other regimes, 
traditional monarchies spend much more in education compared to military and civilian 
dictators while, civilian dictatorships spend more in health than other regime types. These 
considerations lead to affirm that the size of the winning coalition and party-competition 
are weak indicators for policy decisions.  
 Surprisingly, authoritarian regimes that report higher levels of military expenditure 







Variable H1a H1b H2 H3 
Health expenditure 




Accepted Accepted Rejected Rejected 




Variable H4a H4b H4c H5 H6 
Health expenditure  




Rejected Accepted Accepted Rejected Rejected 
Table 12 Summary of findings – political determinants 
 
 
reasonable to believe that higher levels of military expenditure is linked to the presence 
of military conflicts and civil wars in the region which in turns, may affect the demand 
for health services and state assistance. Additionally, as we have seen in the Chapter 2, 
some scholars demonstrate that there is an intrinsic nexus between wars and welfare in 
western democracies. War in facts, creates the conditions for increasing demand of social 
protection while at the same time fosters the state to implement policy reform (Obinger, 
Petersen, and Starke 2018).That being said, the empirical analysis in this chapter supports 
the evidence that health, education and military spending in authoritarian regimes 
complement to each other. Finally, there is no evidence than democratic experience would 
improve the level of health and education expenditure. Contrary to our common wisdom, 
this results shows that some autocratic leaders may promote democracy in the country 
but leaving a vail of autocratic legacy in the allocation of resources.
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The central message for future research is that the effects of authoritarian institutions cannot be 
studied separately from the concrete problems of redistribution, policy making and regime 
maintenance that motivate regimes. 







Autocracy differs from democracy because the leader is not elected through free and fair 
elections, political participation is constrained and the power lies in the hands of a narrow 
group of individuals (Dahl 1971; Olson 1993). Yet, autocracies are not all equal, and 
dictators often differ in terms of policy decisions. For instance, some autocrats govern by 
providing extensive policy concessions to their citizens, such as Cuba under Fidel Castro 
or Italy under Mussolini, while others secure their position in power by distributing less 
and repressing their citizens, such as the current governments of North Korea and 
Turkmenistan. What factors drive the allocation of public goods in authoritarian regimes, 
and why do some autocrats adopt more extensive social spending than others? 
So far, research on social policy has mostly focused on the emergence and evolution 
of social policy and welfare systems in Western democracies (Myles and Quadagno 
2002). In particular, functionalist theories argue that changes in the production system 
and the accumulation of capital account for the expansion of social rights and spending 
in those contexts, while the power-resource approach and the neo-institutionalist 
perspective shed light on the organisation of power and the role of institutions. Yet, scant 
attention has been devoted to autocratic welfare states. Interestingly, the history of social 
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policy is intertwined with the history of authoritarianism. The Prussian Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck, considered the father of the modern welfare state, was the first to 
implement social insurance programs by the end of the 1880s; both Mussolini and Hitler 
developed extensive social programs once they were in power (Manson 2008). Some 
scholars argue that autocratic institutions shape policy decisions (Cassani and Carbone 
2016; Eibl 2020; Gandhi 2008b), while others contend that social policies only reflect 
autocrats’ interests, as the decision-making process in those contexts is strictly 
hierarchical and opposition groups do not participate (Hasmath and Hsu 2016).  
The argument in this work is that social policies are used by autocrats to acquire 
political consensus and secure their position of power. To this end, I argue that there are 
several economic and political factors that shape policy decisions. Building on previous 
works and preliminary evidence, I hypothesise that economic growth affects the pool of 
resources that each autocrat can tap into while at the same time impinging on the demand 
for state intervention in the social sector. However, autocracies with better economic 
performance are either resource-rich regimes, such as Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates or Saudi Arabia, or report high levels of trade openness, such as Singapore. In 
this regard, contrary to rentier-state literature, which argues that resource-rich countries 
have higher levels of social spending, I argue that oil-rich autocracies tend to spend less 
than oil-poor autocracies because leaders in oil-rich autocracies have less incentives to 
distribute social benefits than those in resource-poor autocracies. Instead, trade openness 
fosters the demand for state intervention, as globalisation induces new economic and 
social risks for the most vulnerable groups and governments compensate by adopting new 
policy measures.  
Economic growth, natural resource endowment and trade openness, however, do 
not always directly translate into policy measures. Political institutions and the size and 
type of the ruling coalition may mediate the effect of those factors on social spending 
decisions. Different coalition size, for instance, determine the need for autocrats to 
distribute resources. Autocrats that govern with the support of a smaller coalition size 
have less incentive to distribute public goods compared to regimes with larger coalition 
sizes, as the number of people that should be pleased is smaller. Although different from 
monarchies and civilian dictatorships, military regimes spend less on social benefits, as 
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their primary concern is the distribution of resources to members of the military juntas 
rather than to citizens.  
Political institutions, such as elections and party competition, also influence social 
policy decisions. Political power in traditional regimes is maintained through informal 
networks of family members or military groups, and therefore, decision-making is 
characterised by a strong centralisation of power in the hands of the leader. Instead, 
electoral regimes allow for some form of political competition, which spurs more 
participation from oppositional groups in the decision-making process. Hence, the 
resulting policy decisions in electoral regimes reflect a broader constellation of interests 
compared to the one adopted in traditional regimes.  
In light of such considerations, the next paragraphs discuss the main findings of this 
work and present potential pathways for research on social policy in authoritarian regimes 
in order to better understand policy selections in non-democratic contexts. Importantly, 
the following two paragraphs discuss the results according to the two macro-
approaches—economic and political—that I have adopted through this work.  
 
 
5.1 Overview of the Main Findings 
 
Economic Development, Natural Resources and Globalisation  
 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that economic performance has a double effect on social 
spending in authoritarian regimes. First, dictatorships that grow faster tend to spend less 
on both health and education compared to less economic-performing regimes. 
Importantly, this result is supported by the evidence that oil-and-gas-rich autocracies—
countries with the highest levels of GDP growth — spend less in both sectors compared 
to oil-and-gas-poor countries — countries with the lowest levels of GDP growth. Second, 
GDP per capita also has a double effect on social spending. It boosts education and health 
spending in the short term, but this effect tends to disappear over the long run. 
Importantly, as for economic growth, positive changes in income per capita foster health 




Overall, both results demonstrate that an improvement in economic performance does not 
have the same effect on social spending in resource-rich or resource-poor autocracies. 
Additionally, the effect is different in the short run than in the long run. That is, an 
increase in the economic performance of the regime is reflected in higher levels of 
spending in the short term, but this effect tends to disappear over the long term. Similarly, 
to the conclusions reached by Kuznets (1955), this work demonstrates that income per 
capita has an inverse U-shaped effect on social spending.  
Surprisingly, the effect of natural resources is negative. Countries such as Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates spend less than resource-poor autocracies. 
Although this result contradicts the hypothesised ‘spending effect’ of natural resource 
abundance, elaborated on by Ross  (2001), it is important to highlight that natural resource 
endowment is positively associated with the economic performance of the country. 
Therefore, for higher levels of oil and gas production, the income of the population 
increases, and therefore, people demand less state intervention than in the case of more 
poor societies. Overall, this evidence corroborates the idea that natural abundance is more 
of a curse than a blessing.  
Finally, there is no substantive evidence to conclude that trade openness is linked 
with improved social outputs. In fact, countries such as Singapore — the most opened 
economy — do not display significantly different levels in both health and education 
spending than more closed regimes, such as Sudan.  
 
 
Ruling Coalition, Political Institutions and Ideology  
 
Regarding political factors, this work demonstrates that both the type of the ruling 
coalition and the level of institutionalisation determine different patterns of social 
spending, although the size of the ruling coalition only weakly impinges on policy 
decisions.  
Military regimes are the worst performers in terms of education spending. In fact, 
those regimes have consistently lower levels of social spending compared to monarchies 
and civilian dictatorships. However, compared to monarchies, civilian dictatorships have 
higher levels of spending in health rather than in education. This result hints at the three 
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conclusions. First, the type of ruling coalition accounts for differences in the level of 
social spending, as monarchies, military and civilian dictators report different levels of 
spending. Second, autocrats in military regimes tend to distribute more benefits to the 
members of the ruling coalition rather than to their citizens. In fact, military regimes are 
far less responsive to the well-being of their citizens compared to monarchies and civilian 
autocracies. Third, civilian dictatorships spend much more on health than all other regime 
types, but monarchies are the biggest spender in education. Based on this evidence, 
monarchs are more attentive to the needs of the younger population compared to other 
regimes.   
Interestingly, the level of institutionalisation partially explains the different patterns 
of social spending. Electoral regimes always outperform traditional regimes in both 
health and education expenditures, but differences in party competition do not relate to 
different levels of spending. In fact, one-party regimes spend more than both no-party 
and limited-multiparty regimes. This result provides an important contribution to the 
literature. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Gandhi (2008) did not find any statistical 
evidence of the effect of institutions on social spending. Yet, this work argues that not all 
institutions impact on policy decisions. Elections shape policy selections by allowing 
oppositional groups to enter the political arena and potentially influence social spending. 
However, once elections are established, the extent of party competition does not have 
any real impact on policy decisions. Building on this evidence and in line with the work 
of Meltzer and Richard (1981), we can argue that policy decisions in electoral autocracies 
reflect the preferences of the median actor that, in the case of electoral regimes, is the 
ruling governing party.  
Finally, the effect of political ideology is twofold. Right-wing autocracies spend 
more on health than both central and left-wing regimes, while left-wing regimes have 
higher levels of spending in education compared to all other regimes. This result triggers 
further reflection on the effect of the right-left political ideology continuum on different 
policy issues. However, as we have seen in Chapter 4, data for political ideology is not 
complete for the period of investigation in which this research takes place, and many 
autocracies do not fit into the left-right ideological classification. Thus, this work urges 




Democratic Experience, Military Expenditure and Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, oppositional strength is quite difficult to operationalise. Little 
research has been conducted in this specific area and therefore, data on the material 
resources of those groups in authoritarian regimes are incomplete, as well as information 
about the size of their memberships. To deal with the problem of missing data for 
oppositional strength, I have assumed that democratic experience would provide a more 
favourable context for oppositional groups to voice their dissent and potentially enter the 
political arena. In light of such considerations, a greater amount of democratic experience 
would reflect stronger oppositional groups in authoritarian regimes. The analysis, 
however, does not hint at the strong effect of democratic experience on health and 
education expenditures. In fact, the empirical evidence in this work suggests that 
democracies have a slight positive effect on health expenditure, but no effect on 
education. This result shows that autocratic leaders may promote democracy in the 
country, but they still leave a vail of autocratic legacy in the allocation of resources. 
Surprisingly, authoritarian regimes that report higher levels of military expenditure 
are associated with higher levels of public expenditure in both health and education. 
Importantly, as Figure A.10 and A.11 in the Appendix demonstrate, levels of military 
spending are not associated with military regime types as monarchies have higher levels 
of military spending compared to all other regimes. In view of such evidence, it is 
reasonable to assume that higher levels of military expenditure are linked to the presence 
of military conflicts and civil wars in the region, which in turn may affect the demand for 
health services and state assistance. Additionally, as seen in Chapter 3, some scholars 
demonstrate that there is an intrinsic nexus between war and welfare in Western 
democracies. War creates the conditions for the increasing demand for social protection, 
while at the same time fosters the implementation of states’ policy reforms (Obinger, 
Petersen, and Starke 2018). That being said, the analysis supports the evidence that health, 
education and military spending in authoritarian regimes complement each other.  
In line with to my assumptions, ethnic fractionalisation negatively affects health 
and education spending. More divided societies tend to spend less on public goods than 
more homogeneous societies. This result is due to the fact that more divided societies also 
reflect divisions in political power. For instance, Myanmar and Pakistan are countries that 
have been ripped off by ethnic conflicts over the last twenty years, and yet, they both 
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show significantly low levels of health and education expenditures when compared to 
other autocracies.  
 
 
5.2  Future Pathways in the Research on Autocratic Welfare States 
 
 
Overall, this work aims to provide a solid understanding of the dynamics of social policy 
in authoritarian contexts. To this end, I developed an inclusive and comprehensive 
theoretical framework that sheds light on many aspects of policy selections in 
authoritarian regimes. Yet, this dissertation is not an exhaustive work on this topic; rather, 
these results are aimed at triggering new pathways in the research on autocratic welfare 
states.  
First, there is a need to abandon the left-right political dimensions. In particular, we 
should disentangle autocracies according to the policy issue dimension in order to better 
understand policy selections in those contexts. The next step would be to draw a line 
between more inclusive and exclusive regimes in terms of health, education and social 
protection benefits and coverage. Very recently, some work has been done in this 
direction (Eibl 2020; Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2020), though much work is still 
needed.  
Second, this project calls for further investigation on the relationship between 
military and social spending. As discussed throughout the dissertation, the majority of 
studies point to the crow-out effect of military expenditure compared to social policy. 
However, I demonstrate that military and social policies are positively linked to one 
another. In light of such evidence, there is a need to investigate which levels of military 
expenditure this relationship holds true to and how autocrats finance military and social 
spending simultaneously. In fact, this dissertation demonstrates that autocrats govern with 
both carrots (policies) and sticks (repressive measures) (Gallagher and Hanson 2009). 
Last, the lack of data on oppositional groups is a real threat to the research on public 
policy in authoritarian regimes. To understand autocratic policy selection, one must 
address the preferences and capacities of different actors of relevance. Hence, identifying 
actors’ preferences and resources is of fundamental importance to the study of policy 
decisions in non-democratic contexts. Moreover, the lack of data on oppositional groups’ 
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resources and the scant attention to the preferences of actors that are outside the ruling 
coalition deeply hinder our understanding of policy processes in authoritarian contexts. 
To overcome such obstacles, we should shift our attention towards actors’ preferences 
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Table A.1.  Summary of country-year observations by level of institutionalization  
(1995-2014)  
 Number of Countries Total Observations 
Traditional Monarchy 35 151 
No-party regimes  6 80 
One-party regimes 10 149 
Limited-Multiparty regimes 77 1063 
Total 128a 1443 
Note: The panel sample includes only countries that have been autocratic for more than 3 consecutive years; 




Table A.2. Summary of country-year observations by the size of the winning coalition 
(1995-2014)  
 Number of Countries Total Observations 
Traditional Monarchy 10 181 
Traditional Military 36 419 
Civilian regimes 77 872 
Total 123a 1472 
Note: The panel sample includes only countries that have been autocratic for more than 3 consecutive years; 










Table A.3.  Summary of country-year observations by geographical regions (1995-2014)  
 Number of Countries Total observations  
(only authoritarian)   
Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe a  
15 240 
Latin America 9 91 
Middle-East and North 
Africa 
18 346 
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 610 
East Asia and the Pacific 15 258 
Total  93 1545 
Note: North Korea and Somalia are excluded from the sample as data for the dependent variables are 
completely missing; a It also includes the Caucasus and four countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia 




Table A.4.  Years of authoritarianism for each country  
 
Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union 
 
Number Country Name Time Period Frequencies 
1 Albania 1995-2001 7 
2 Armenia 1995 – 2014 20 
3 Azerbaijan 1995 – 2014 20 
4 Belarus 1995 – 2014 20 
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 – 2014 20 
6 Croatia 1995-1999 5 
7 Georgia 1995-2003  2007-2011 14 
8 Kazakhstan 1995 – 2014 20 
9 Kyrgyzstan 1995 – 2014 20 
10 Macedonia 1995-1997/ 2000-2001 5 
 
 142 
11 Russia 1995 – 2014 20 
12 Tajikistan 1995 – 2014 20 
13 Turkmenistan 1995 – 2014 20 
14 Ukraine 2000-2004/ 2011-2014 9 
15 Uzbekistan 1995 – 2014 20 
Total   240 
 
 
Latin America  
 
Number Country Name Time period Frequency 
1 Colombia 1995-2004 9 
2 Cuba 1995 – 2014 20 
3 Guatemala 2002-2005/ 2009-2010 7 
4 Haiti 1995 – 2014 20 
5 Honduras 1995-2014 6 
6 Mexico 1995-1999 5 
7 Nicaragua 2011-2013 3 
8 Peru 1995-1999 5 
9 Venezuela 1999-2014 16 
Total   91 
 
 
Middle East and North Africa 
 
Number  Country Name  Time period  Frequency 
1 Algeria  1995 – 2014 20 
2 Bahrain 1995 – 2014 20 
3 Egypt  1995 – 2014 20 
4 Iran  1995 – 2014 20 
5 Iraq  1995 – 2014 20 
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6 Jordan  1995 – 2014 20 
7 Kuwait  1995 – 2014 20 
8 Lebanon  1995 – 2014 20 
9 Libya  1995 – 2014 20 
10 Morocco  1995 – 2014 20 
11 Oman  1995 – 2014 20 
12 Qatar  1995 – 2014 20 
13 Saudi Arabia  1995 – 2014 20 
14 Syria  1995 – 2014 20 
15 Tunisia  1995 – 2014 18 
16 Turkey  1995-2001 8 
17 United Arab Emirates  1995 – 2014 20 
18 Yemen  1995 – 2014 20 
Total   346 
 
 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
 
Number  Country Name  Time period  Frequency 
1 Angola  1995 – 2014 20 
2 Burkina Faso  1995 – 2014 20 
3 Burundi  1995 – 2014 20 
4 Cameroon  1995 – 2014 20 
5 Central African 
Republic  
1995 – 2014 20 
6 Chad  1995 – 2014 20 
7 Congo  1995 – 2014 20 
8 Congo, Democratic 
Republic  
1995 – 2014 20 
9 Cote d’Ivoire 1995 – 2014 20 
10 Eritrea  1995 – 2014 20 
11 Ethiopia  1995 – 2014 20 
12 Gabon  1995 – 2014 20 
13 Gambia  1995 – 2014 20 
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14 Ghana 1995 – 2000 6 
15 Guinea  1995 – 2014 20 
16 Guinea-Bissau 1995 – 2014 20 
17 Kenya   2002 / 2009 9 
18 Lesotho  1995 –2001 7 
19 Liberia  1995 – 2014 20 
20 Madagascar 2009 – 2014 6 
21 Malawi 2001 –2014 14 
22 Mali  2012 – 2014 3 
23 Mauritania  1995 – 2014 20 
24 Mozambique 1995 – 2006  
2009 – 2014 
18  
25 Niger 1995 – 2003  
2007 –2014 
17  
26 Nigeria  1995 – 2014 20 
27 Rwanda 1995 – 2014 20 
28 Senegal  1995 –1999 5 
29 Sierra Leone  1995 –2006 12 
30 Sudan (+South Sudan ) 1995 – 2014 20 
31 Swaziland  1995 – 2014 20 
32 Tanzania  1995 – 2014 20 
33 Togo 1995 – 2014 20 
34 Uganda  1995 – 2014 20 
35 Zambia  1995 –2007 13 
36 Zimbabwe  1995 – 2014 20 
 Total   610  
 
 
Asia and the Pacific  
 
Number  Country Name  Time period  Frequency 
1 Afghanistan  1995 – 2014 20 
2 Bangladesh  1999 – 2014 17 
3 Cambodia  1995 – 2014 20 
4 China 1995 – 2014 20 
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5 Indonesia 1995 – 2003 9 
6 Laos 1995 – 2014 20 
7 Malaysia  1995 – 2014 20 
8 Myanmar 1995 – 2014 20 
9 Nepal  1995 – 2014 20 
10 Pakistan  1995 – 2014 20 
11 Papua New Guinea 2008 – 2014 6 
12 Singapore 1995 – 2014 20 
13 Sri Lanka  1995 – 2002  
 2006 – 2014 
17 
14 Thailand  2006 –2014 9 
15 Vietnam  1995 – 2014 20 

































Table A.5. Summary statistics  
Variables N Mean St.dev Min Max 
Public Health  
Expenditure  1837 2.49 1.42 0.04 11.28 
Public Education 
Expenditure a  1200 3.82 1.99 0.75 15.78 
GDP per capita (log) 1816 7.52 1.32 4.75 11.19 
GDP growth  1756 4.84 6.32 -64.18 10.52 
Oil and Gas production per 
capita (log) 1152 5.22 2.73 -6.06 10.09 
Trade openness  (log) 1785 4.21 0.71 -3.86 6.10 
Size of the winning coalition  1472 2.46 0.70 1 3 
Level of institutionalization 1855 3.47 0.99 1 4 
Political Ideology  1659 1.01 1.30 0 3 
Years of democracy  1860 3.39 5.59 3 17 
Military expenditure (log)   1620 0.67 0.70 -2.39 3.68 
Population size (% Total) 
- Above 64 
















Index of Ethnic  
Fractionalization   1837 0.54 0.24 0.04 0.93 
Note: a  It refers to the panel sample after the multiple imputation and on which the analysis has 











Table A.8.  Distribution of the public health expenditure as a % of 
GDP, Average 1995-2014 
 
 
Note: The inner box line represents the median value, while the upper wishers 
refers to the 75th percentile and the lower wishers refers to the 25th percentile. 
Values that fall out of the lines are considered to be outliers  
 
 
Table A.9.  Distribution of the public health expenditure as a % of GDP, 
Average 1995-2014 
 
Note: The inner box line represents the median value, while the upper wishers 
refers to the 75th percentile and the lower wishers refers to the 25th percentile. 





Table A.10.  Military expenditure as a % of GDP across different 





Table A.11.  Military expenditure as a % of GDP across different 
regimes according to the level of institutionalization , Average 1995-
2014 
 
